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WORKERS, INFORMATION, AND CORPORATE COMBINATIONS:  
THE CASE FOR NON-BINDING EMPLOYEE REFERENDA  
IN TRANSFORMATIVE TRANSACTIONS 
 
Matthew T. Bodie* 
 
 
This article proposes that employees be given a vote in nonbinding referenda 
on mergers and other corporate combinations. The purpose of such referenda 
would be twofold. First, they would provide more information to managers, 
directors, and shareholders about the costs and benefits of the proposed 
transaction. Second, they would give employees a voice in the process – a voice 
that is valuable even if it has no material ramifications. Given the low costs in 
implementing the referenda, the article encourages states to consider this 
innovation as a small but significant addition to their corporate law schema. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
How can I convey to you the disgust which your name awakens in me? 
The merger with Warner was a catastrophe. But the hitherto 
unimagined stupidity, the blind arrogance of your deal with Case 
simply beggars description. How can you face yourself knowing how 
much history, value and savings you have thrown away on your mad, 
ignorant attempt to merge with a wretched dial-up ISP? I don’t know 
what advice you have to offer, but I have some for you. Buy some rope, 
go out the back, find a tree and hang yourself. If you had any honor you 
would. 
 
- email from Robert Hughes, Time magazine art critic, to Gerald Levin, 
AOL Time Warner CEO, 20021 
 
 Employees present a curious puzzle for corporate law.  On the one 
hand, employees are central to every business.  The success of a corporation 
depends on its employees, from the chief executive officer down to the front-
line production or service worker.  When we think of a corporation, we think of 
its brand, its business, its leadership, and its employees.  But for the most part, 
corporate law relegates employees to the sidelines.  The players in corporate 
law dramas are management, directors, and shareholders.  The tension between 
shareholders and management is the focal point of corporate scholarship.2  
Employees have no role in corporate governance. 
                                                          
1 KARA SWISHER, THERE MUST BE A PONY IN HERE SOMEWHERE: THE AOL TIME WARNER 
DEBACLE AND THE QUEST FOR A DIGITAL FUTURE 200 (2003). 
2 See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
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 Perhaps nowhere is this contrast as dramatic as in the realm of mergers, 
acquisitions, and other transformative transactions.  Such transactions are 
generally negotiated at the highest levels of management, approved by the 
board, and then announced to great fanfare.3  Shareholders have the power to 
vote on most large-scale combinations and therefore hold veto power over their 
ultimate consummation.4  Employees have no say.  Even unionized employees 
do not have the right to bargain over these transactions; at most, they can 
merely bargain about their effects.5 
 However, as the email in this article’s epigraph vividly demonstrates, 
employees do have opinions about mergers, acquisitions, and other such 
transformative corporate transactions.  Some of these opinions may be fairly 
predictable: for example, employees will be fearful of a merger that promises to 
eliminate huge swaths of the company’s workforce.  But employees also have 
more nuanced opinions about their work environment – opinions based on 
much more intimate knowledge about the company than shareholders typically 
have.  These opinions may be overlooked in the post-announcement 
excitement, especially since management has an interest in hearing only 
positive news about the forthcoming combination. 
 This paper proposes that employees be given the right to vote on 
mergers, sales of substantially all assets, and the other corporate combinations 
for which shareholders can vote.  Unlike shareholders’ ballots, the employees’ 
choices would not be binding on the company.  The referenda would be held 
before the required shareholders’ elections, so that shareholders could know 
about the results before they cast their votes.  Although it might be possible to 
                                                                                                                                             
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (“We focus in this 
paper on the behavioral implications of the property rights specified in the contracts between the 
owners and managers of the firm.”); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the 
Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1993) (“Managerial 
accountability to shareholders is corporate law’s central problem.”).  Cf. Edward B. Rock & 
Michael Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing 
Corporation, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2001) (“It was as if everyone already knew (from 
Berle and Means) that the master problem of corporate law was agency costs, and along came an 
economic model and a vocabulary to elaborate that view.”). 
3 In this description I refer only to transactions in which two companies combine; I do not include 
hostile tender offers.  Such offers may lead to shareholders’ selling their shares over the 
objections of the target company’s board. 
4 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.03 (2004). 
5 Employers need not bargain over issues that are within the “core of entrepreneurial control.”   
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981) (no duty to bargain over 
decision to shut down part of business purely for economic reasons); International Union, United 
Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422, 425 
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (no duty to bargain regarding “sale” of manufacturer-owned and operated retail 
outlets to franchisers).  However, employers must bargain over the effects such actions have on 
terms and conditions of employment.  First National Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 676. 
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implement the referenda through federal law, states could also enact the 
referendum as part of their systems for corporate governance. 
 Why require corporations to conduct non-binding employee referenda?  
First, the referenda will improve the information flow surrounding corporate 
combinations and will lead to more efficient transactions.  Mergers and 
acquisitions are generally negotiated under a heavy shroud of secrecy by the 
very top levels of management.6  After the initial agreement is announced, 
management has a strong incentive to see that the merger is approved, 
weakening any incentive for a robust debate on the merits of the plan.  An 
employee vote would provide concrete data about workers’ opinions on the 
merger.  Although the vote would not have any legal effect, directors, 
management, and shareholders may find the expression of collective employee 
wisdom to be useful in making their own determinations about the wisdom of 
the proposed combination. Moreover, the vote would offer employees and 
shareholders the opportunity to work together in furtherance of their mutual 
interest: curtailing managerial rent-seeking. 
 Second, the vote will make employees feel more a part of the company 
by giving them a voice in the process.  Current corporate law doctrine treats 
employees as a purchased input, no different than raw materials or property 
expenses.7  The referendum will give employees a chance to express their 
opinion on the combination.  Social psychology research has shown that 
employee voice leads to improved productivity and job satisfaction, as well as 
greater corporate compliance.8  Allowing employees to participate in the 
process creates a greater likelihood that employees will buy into the merger and 
thus work for its success.  In addition, the process of collective deliberation has 
the potential to create social capital that will come into play in other societal 
moments of democracy. 
 Finally, the proposed referenda impose relatively small costs on 
companies.  With improved technology, it is much easier and less expensive to 
conduct a company-wide election than it once was.9  Rather than mailing proxy 
materials to employees, employers will be able to make use of inter-office mail, 
email, and corporate web pages to distribute the necessary materials and 
                                                          
6 See DAVID A. BROADWIN, NEGOTIATING AND DOCUMENTING BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS 2 (1997) 
(discussing the importance of confidentiality agreements to merger negotiations); J. Robert 
Brown, Corporate Secrecy, the Federal Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of Ongoing 
Negotiations, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 93 (1986) (“Most major arms length agreements are 
preceded by a period of negotiations that typically take place behind a veil of secrecy.”). 
7 Cf. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 60-66 (2006) (comparing the corporate 
law protections for shareholders with the absence of such protections for employees). 
8 Part III infra. 
9 See Part IV infra. 
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conduct the final tally.  It is an ideal opportunity for state experimentation – the 
“genius” of American corporate law.10 
 The barriers between corporate and labor law have too long stymied 
efforts to provide employees with more involvement in their work life.  Recent 
studies have made clear that workers want some form of meaningful 
participation in their place of employment.11  Traditional responses, such as 
employee ownership, ESOPs, labor unions, and work councils, have failed thus 
far to provide such opportunities to a large percentage of the workforce.  The 
implementation of these employee referenda would finally give workers a voice 
on issues of corporate transformation, in an area where their input would 
benefit managers, directors, and shareholders as well. 
 
I. THE PROPOSAL 
 
 In the United States, corporations are creatures of state law.12  The 
delegation of such a critical legal regime to a collection of fifty independent 
governmental regimes has drawn both praise and criticism.13  What is perhaps 
more remarkable, however, is the relative uniformity of corporate law despite 
its many creators.  In these different regimes, the central locus of authority 
within the corporation is the board of directors.14  The board has the authority to 
hire the officers of the corporation and to terminate the officers according to 
contractual provisions.  Although we generally think of the chief executive 
officer as the head of the corporation, the board has the authority to remove the 
CEO from office.  In turn, the shareholders have the authority to elect the 
board.  This power structure has led to the conception that shareholders are the 
ultimate “owners” of the corporation.15  However, directors have the right to 
run the corporation largely as they wish and need not follow the dictates of a 
                                                          
10 ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). 
11 RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (1999). 
12 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 31 (2d ed. 2003). 
13 See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 10 (praising the system); William L. Cary, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (criticizing it). 
14 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy: 
Means and Ends] (discussing how boards of directors control corporations).  For an example of 
the statutory provisions giving directors control, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141 (2007). 
15 Current corporate scholars largely consider this conception to be a misconception.  See Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 604 
(2006) (calling this view “deeply erroneous”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments 
for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2002) (“From both a legal and an 
economic perspective, the claim that shareholders own the public corporation simply is 
empirically incorrect.”). 
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majority of shareholders on any particular issue.16  They are thus akin to 
Burkean representatives: the elected representatives of their constituencies who 
may govern largely according to their personal conscience.17 
 For certain fundamental corporate acts, however, directors need the 
approval of a majority of shareholders.  Amendments to the corporation’s 
charter or article of incorporation must generally be approved by the Board and 
by the shareholders.18  Shareholders must also consent to the voluntary 
dissolution of the corporation.19  States have also generally required shareholder 
approval for transactions that transform the institutional structure of the 
corporation through a combination with another corporation.  The standard 
method of combination is the statutory merger.20  However, corporations also 
de facto combine when one corporation buys the assets of the other corporation 
or when a corporation buys the corporation’s shares through a tender offer.  Not 
all corporate combinations require shareholder approval.  Mergers generally 
require shareholder approval from the shareholders of both companies.21  In 
Delaware, the state of incorporation for roughly fifty percent of the nation’s 
public companies,22 mergers require approval from the shareholders of both 
companies unless the company’s charter will remain unchanged post-merger 
and less than twenty percent of the company’s outstanding common stock 
would be involved in the merger.23  Shareholders must also approve a 
corporation’s sale of “substantially all” of its assets.24  This language, which is 
found in every jurisdiction, has been interpreted with some variation, but it 
generally means the sale of a significant portion of the corporation’s assets in a 
transaction outside of the corporation’s regular course of business.25 
                                                          
16 For an early expounding of this principle, see Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. 
Cunninghame, 2 Ch. 34 (Eng. C.A. 1906). 
17 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 83, 102-03 (2004) (describing directors as “vested with wide powers to exercise their 
discretion by fiat”). 
18 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (2004). 
19 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(b) (2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.01 (2004). 
20 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.03 (2004). 
21 See COX & HAZEN, supra note 12, at 609 (“Most states now provide for majority approval by 
the shares entitled to vote . . . .”).  Cox and Hazen note, however, that Massachusetts requires the 
approval of two-thirds of the shareholders, and New York requires a two-thirds vote for 
corporations created before 1989.  See id. (citing MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156, § 46B(5) (Law. Co-
op 2000); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 903 (McKinney 1986 supp. 2002). 
22 The website for Delaware's Division of Corporations states that "[m]ore than half a million 
business entities have their legal home in Delaware including more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-
traded companies and 60% of the Fortune 500." Del. Dep't of State, Div. of Corps., Why Choose 
Delaware as Your Corporate Home?, at http://www.state.de.us/corp/default.shtml.  
23 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251(c), (f) (2007). 
24 Id. § 271(a). 
25 COX & HAZEN, supra note 12, at 594-96. 
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 Why are shareholders given the right to veto these transforming 
transactions?  According to one commentator, the basic idea is that “sudden, 
deliberate (that is, manager-initiated), major or ‘organic’ corporate changes that 
affect shareholder interests ought to be approved or consented to by some 
majority of the shareholders.”26  There seem to be two primary concerns here: 
first, a concern about the drastic nature of the change, and second, a concern 
that this change is initiated and controlled by management.  With respect to the 
nature of the change, corporate law wants to give shareholders the right to vote 
down a proposal that would significantly alter the nature of the holdings in the 
company.  As residual claimants, shareholders are considered the most 
“vulnerable” of the corporation’s stakeholders to management agency costs.27  
Severe changes in the nature and scope of the enterprise will have more of a 
direct effect on their rights than the rights of bondholders or employees.  In 
fact, mergers often force shareholders to exchange their stock for stock in 
another company or in a newly formed company.28  Given the changes in their 
contractual rights, shareholders have a strong interest in having some control 
over the transformation of their company’s internal corporate structure.29 
 There is also a concern that transformative transactions offer an 
opportunity for management to protect its own interests at the expense of the 
shareholders.30  Corporate combinations offer an opportunity for executives to 
receive a one-time monetary, stock, or stock option bonus based on the 
fulfillment of the merger.  When one company’s management will be replaced 
or subordinated as a result of the transaction, the deal will often arrange for a 
large payout to those managers as compensation for their loss of position.31  
Conversely, executives of the newly-formed company may give themselves 
                                                          
26 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 10.2.4 at 414 (1986). 
27 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 1-39 (1991). 
28 For example, in its merger with Alcatel, Lucent Technologies was absorbed into an Alcatel 
subsidiary and ceased to exist.  Former Lucent shareholders were given shares in the Alcatel 
subsidiary.  See Lucent Technologies Form 8-K, Form No. 01-116839, Nov. 20, 2006 (Item 
3.01), available at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1006240/000089882206001443/-
fm8kdec6.txt. 
29 More generally, former Delaware Chancellor Allen has described the shareholder franchise as 
“the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”  Blasius 
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del Ch. 1988). 
30 The field of corporate law has largely centered around the general problem of management 
opportunism.  See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 27; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 171 (1996).  
31 For example, James Kilts, the former CEO of Gillette Company, received a package worth an 
estimated $165 million as part of the merger of Gillette with Procter & Gamble.  Gretchen 
Morgenson, What Are Mergers Good For?, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005, at 56, 58 (magazine). 
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bonuses for having successfully carried out the combination.32  Having the right 
to veto a transaction gives shareholders power to vote down a transaction that 
would reward management at the expense of the shareholders.33   
 This paper proposes an employee referendum for transformative 
transactions which would piggyback on top of the existing system of 
shareholder voting rights.  Employees at a company involved in a combination 
would be entitled to vote in a non-binding referendum on the combination 
whenever shareholders also had the right to vote on the combination.  All 
employees would be entitled to cast a ballot.  The referendum would be held 
prior to the shareholders’ vote, with enough time for the results of the 
referendum to be communicated to shareholders prior to their vote.34  Since the 
referendum would not be binding on the corporation, the directors, or the 
shareholders, victory or defeat would have no legal effect on the proposed 
transaction.  The percentage of employee votes for and against would be the 
critical information communicated to the shareholders and (by extension) the 
general public. 
Further specifics are, of course, in order.  The statute would need to 
define who the corporation’s “employees” were for purposes of the vote.  The 
statute would also have to describe the timing and scope of the required 
disclosure that would be made to shareholders.  The statute could also set forth 
what procedures would need to be followed for the vote, as well as whether 
there were any remedies for improper procedures.  These details, and the effect 
they would have on the proposal, are discussed further in Part IV of the paper.  
As a reference for what such a statute might look like, I have included a 
proposed amendment to Delaware law in Appendix A. 
 The lack of any legal effect to the employee referenda may prompt an 
initial concern that such a vote would be “meaningless.”  The vote would, in 
fact, have no legal effect on the outcome of the proposed transaction; 
employees could vote overwhelmingly to reject a proposed merger only to see 
it enacted through director and shareholder approval.  Given the lack of legal 
power behind the employee vote, what would be the point?  The point is not to 
create a regime of employee participation in governance, along the lines of the 
German system of codetermination.35  Such a system would require real power 
                                                          
32 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE 
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 127-30 (2004) (discussing bonuses paid for acquisitions). 
33 Morgenson, supra note 31, at 58 (discussing how MONY shareholders threatened to vote 
against a merger with AXA because of the high executive compensation to MONY executives). 
34 Delaware requires notice to shareholders about the merger vote at least 20 days prior.  SeE DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251(c) (2007).  The employee referendum would need to be held early enough 
so that the shareholder proxy materials could include the results of the referendum. 
35 For a discussion of German codetermination, see Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A 
Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 163 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). 
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sharing, whether through board participation, expanded union powers, or some 
form of binding referenda.  But this proposal is not a piece of that endeavor.  In 
fact, the objective of this proposal is to reap a portion of the benefits of 
employee participation without some of the drawbacks and complications 
codetermination engenders.  With this in mind, I now turn to the reasons in 
support of the proposed system of non-binding employee referenda: more 
information, greater voice, and the low costs of experimentation. 
 
II. REFERENDUM AS INFORMATION 
 
 As a non-binding resolution, the results of the employee referenda will 
have no inherent legal power of their own.  What the referenda will provide, 
however, is information: information about whether the company’s employees 
support or object to the corporate combination that has been proposed by 
management.  As discussed below, this information will be useful to those 
groups who do have power over the transactions: shareholders and boards of 
directors.  This information will increase the likelihood that shareholders and 
directors will reject inefficient transactions.  As a result, management will do a 
better job in carrying out these transactions from the start.   
 In order to understand what this information will convey and how it 
will affect corporate decisionmaking, it is helpful to begin with a brief 
description of both the purposes and the processes of mergers and acquisitions. 
 
A. The Purpose of Corporate Combinations 
 It may seem overkill to spend time considering the purpose of a 
corporate combination.  Combining two companies is one of many possible 
business decisions and thus should share the same rationale as the decision to 
borrow money, hire employees, or purchase raw materials.  Like any of these 
decisions, the decision to combine with another company should rest on the 
same principles behind the corporation itself.  As is well known, however, the 
purpose of the corporation itself has been the subject of prolonged, sustained 
debate among corporate law scholars.  Proceeding without considering this 
debate risks a failure to establish first principles and, thereby, a failure to 
establish the criteria upon which the employee referenda proposal is to be 
judged.36 
                                                          
36 William Klein has recently criticized the failure of corporate law academics to establish such 
first principles clearly.  See William Klein, Criteria for Good Laws of Business Association, 2 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 13, 15 (2005) (“Academics debating various aspects of the law of business 
associations are often like ships passing in the night. One reason for their inability to join issue 
may be a failure to identify goals or objectives--the failure to weigh proposals against explicitly 
stated criteria and to engage in effective cost-benefit analysis.”). 
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Corporate law scholars generally employ a utilitarian approach, seeking 
to maximize the overall gains to society through the corporate form.  In 
pursuing this end, the majority of corporate scholars ascribe to the notion of 
“shareholder primacy,” or “shareholder wealth maximization.”37  The theory of 
shareholder wealth maximization posits that by maximizing the returns to 
shareholders above all other corporate goals, the corporation will also maximize 
its contribution to societal efficiency.  This conception rests on the 
shareholders’ role as the sole “residual claimants” within the corporation.  
According to the theory, other actors within the corporation – creditors, 
employees, customers, suppliers – have a relationship to the corporation that is 
fairly well-defined through contract.38  However, shareholders’ returns are 
residual; they are not payable until the other contractual participants had been 
fully satisfied.39  In order to maximize social wealth, the corporation’s 
organizing principle should be the maximization of the residual returns payable 
to shareholders.  In this way, all other claimants receive their contractual 
entitlements, and shareholders’ remainder has been maximized. 
 On the other side of this debate stand those who argue for a 
stakeholder-oriented conception of the corporation.40  According to stakeholder 
theorists, the corporation’s purpose should focus on serving all of the 
corporation’s stakeholders.  In addition to shareholders, those with a stake in 
the corporation include management, employees, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, and even the broader community in which the corporation is 
situated.41  Stakeholder theorists argue that a corporation and its directors 
should focus on maximizing returns to all of these stakeholders.  Although 
commentators differ as to the means, most agree that directors should have a 
significant degree of discretion in carrying out their duties so as to serve all of 
these interests.42 
 Much of recent corporate law scholarship has taken up this debate 
about the proper purpose of the corporation.  Both sides hold strong opinions.  
In 2001, one set of pro-shareholder-primacy commentators stated that “[t]here 
                                                          
37 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 798 n.35 (2002) (“Today, most corporate law scholars embrace some 
variant of shareholder primacy.”). 
38 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 27, at 67-68. 
39 Id. at 36-37.  This perspective assumes that all other claimants have rigidly-set contractual 
entitlements, such that paying them more would be akin to a gift. 
40 See Stout, supra note 15, at 1190 (citing William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of 
the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264-66 (1992)). 
41 Stout, supra note 15, at 1190. 
42 See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 118-19 (2001) (arguing that 
boards of directors should be self-perpetuating); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280-81 (1999) (arguing for the notion 
of directors as “mediating hierarchs” for the different constituencies at the firm). 
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is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should 
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value,”43 while a 
stakeholder theorist argued that the notion of stock price maximization is “as 
destructive as it is simple.”44  However, it is also possible to make too much of 
this distinction.  In the long term, stock price maximization will depend on 
keeping the other constituencies happy as well; cheating customers, employees, 
or creditors will surely harm the company and by extension its stock price as 
well.  And stakeholder theorists have acknowledged that some focus on share 
price can be a useful tool for constraining the discretion of management.45  
Courts, as a whole, have not spent too much time on the debate themselves, 
preferring to stick to the more practical concerns of fiduciary duties and 
conflicts of interest.46 
 In this paper I sidestep this debate, arguing that non-binding employee 
referenda would be beneficial under both shareholder primacy theory and 
stakeholder theory.  In other words, these referenda would improve overall 
societal efficiency regardless of whether the best route to such efficiency is 
shareholder wealth maximization or some version of stakeholder interests 
maximization.  As discussed further below, this dual approach rests primarily 
on the role of the referenda in informing directors and shareholders,47 the role 
of the referenda in restraining management,48 and the role of the referenda in 
improving employee morale, productivity, and efficiency.49  All of these 
benefits would lead to better results according to shareholder primacy as well as 
stakeholder theory.50  Thus, for purposes of this paper, the purpose of corporate 
combinations need only be the same purpose as the corporate form: namely, 
increasing societal efficiency by maximizing returns to shareholders or 
maximizing returns to all of the stakeholders in the company.  Moreover, there 
are reasons for concern that corporate combinations – as currently constructed – 
are failing along both of these measures. 
 
                                                          
43 Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439, 439 (2001). 
44 MITCHELL, supra note 42, at 4. 
45 Stout, supra note 15, at 1200. 
46 See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 22 J. CORP. L. 277, 280, 284-88 (1998) 
(discussing how the concept of shareholder primacy has limited relevance to corporate law in 
practice). 
47 See Part II.D infra. 
48 See Part II.D.3 infra. 
49 See Part III infra. 
50 What they do not support is a strong notion of managerial primacy, but concern about agency 
costs has largely driven managerial primacy from the debate.  See Bainbridge, Director Primacy: 
Means and Ends, supra note 14, at 549 (noting that managerial primacy “no longer has much 
traction in the legal academy”). 
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B. Problems with Corporate Combinations 
 The initial challenge raised to employee referenda may be that their 
absence under current law is a result of properly-made market decisions.  If the 
reform really increased firm efficiency, the argument goes, the market would 
have already developed it.51  However, corporate combinations have been the 
subject of extensive study in both law and finance literature, and there are 
grounds for believing that such combinations decrease firm value.  These 
substantive concerns coincide with procedural concerns about incentives on the 
part of executives, directors, and consultants to act inefficiently in their own 
interest. 
 1. Substantive Problem: Poor Results.  Corporate combinations can 
often be scenes of shipwreck-level destruction for the companies involved.  
Although some potential for failure is inherent in any enterprise, there is 
evidence that corporate combinations may be generally value-reducing for the 
participating firms.  The effects of corporate combinations on firm value and on 
stock price are much studied phenomena in the financial literature.  The results 
have been different for targets (smaller companies that will be taken over) as 
compared with acquiring companies.  There is general consensus that in the 
very short term, when the corporate combination is announced, there are large 
positive abnormal returns to companies that are the target of a proposed merger 
or acquisition.52  While there is conflicting evidence on acquirers, the evidence 
is sufficiently mixed that “the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance to 
acquirers should not be rejected.”53  These results are attributable to the general 
process whereby the acquirer offers to pay a premium over and above the 
current market price for the target’s shares.  Indeed, offers that are at or are 
minimally above the current market price are generally rejected as non-
serious.54  Thus, in the short term, gains from a merger announcement are often 
                                                          
51 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1736-44 (2006) (criticizing Lucian Bebchuk’s programme of shareholder 
empowerment because it has not already appeared in the marketplace).  But see Michael D. 
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 
793-96 (2006) (discussing how learning and network externalities may impair efficient corporate 
innovations). 
52 Anup Agrawal & Jeffery E. Jaffe, The Post-merger Performance Puzzle, in ADVANCES IN 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 7, 7 (Cary Cooper and Alan Gregory eds., 2000). 
53 Id. (citing Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197 
(1986)). 
54 For example, Oracle was widely denounced for its initial bid to purchase PeopleSoft, which 
offered little to no premium over market price.  As one analyst stated, “If [Oracle is] serious, 
they’re going to have to up their bid by a significant premium.”  Andrew Ross Sorking & Laura 
Flynn, Oracle Takes $5 Billion Jab at PeopleSoft, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003. at C1, C2.  See also 
Robin Sidel & David Bank, PeopleSoft Bid By Oracle Corp. Busts Tradition, WALL ST. J., June 
10, 2003, at C1, C5 (noting that the Oracle bid “broke two longstanding traditions of deal 
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zero sum, as the short-term boost to the target is offset by the loss to the 
acquirer. 
 Over the long term, however, there are indications that corporate 
combinations do not increase overall societal efficiency.  Studies on long-term 
returns for corporate acquisitions have generally shown “strong evidence of 
abnormal under-performance following mergers.”55  There is empirical 
evidence on both sides, and academics continue to refine and debate the best 
methods for determining long-term performance.56  However, the overall 
pattern has been one of value-reduction in the long term.  Numerous academic, 
financial, and media commentators have noted the failure of corporate 
combinations to bring long-term gains.57 
 Furthermore, corporate combinations are more likely to fail in 
situations where the employee referendum would take place – namely, where a 
vote of the shareholders is required to execute the combination.  As noted 
earlier, shareholders must vote to approve most mergers, as well as the sale of 
substantially all of their company’s assets.58  However, this leaves some large 
swaths of corporate combinations uncovered.  Most notably, shareholders do 
not vote when the acquisition is through means of a tender offer.  Instead, 
shareholders “vote” for a tender offer by tendering their shares to the acquirer, 
and the acquirer treats the purchase as a normal business transaction.  This 
contrasts with mergers between two companies in which the companies trade 
stock to create a new corporation.  Studies have demonstrated that companies 
                                                                                                                                             
making: [m]ake an offer that carries a hefty premium to the target’s stock price and first approach 
the target privately with a friendly bid”). 
55 Agrawal & Jaffe, supra note 52, at (50). 
56 See, e.g., John D. Lyon et al., Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock 
Returns, 52 J. FIN. 165 (1999). 
57 See, e.g., ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE THE ASHES 
14 (2005) (“The popular view is that M & A is a loser’s game.”); Robert G. Eccles et al., Are You 
Paying Too Much for That Acquisition?, HARV. BUS. REV. 136, 136 (July-August 1999) (noting 
“30 years of evidence demonstrating that most acquisitions do not create value for the acquiring 
company’s shareholders”); James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming 
Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 280 (2001) (“Evidence from 
past merger waves shows that public companies engaging in mergers underperform their peer 
companies that have not followed similar acquisition strategies.”); Sara Moeller et al., Firm Size 
and the Gains from Acquisition, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 201 (2004) (finding that takeovers by large 
firms have destroyed $226 billion of shareholder wealth over 20 years); Morgenson, supra note 
31, at 56 (“Academic research suggests that few mergers add up to significantly more prosperous 
or successful companies  . . . .”); Gregory Zuckerman, Ahead of the Tape, WALL ST .J., Dec. 30, 
2002, at C1 (“Most mergers don’t work . . . .  A mountain of academic research shows most 
acquisitions end up costing shareholders.”); “Why Most Big Deals Don’t Pay Off: A 
BusinessWeek Analysis Shows that 61% of Buyers Destroyed Shareholder Wealth,” BUS. WEEK, 
Oct. 14, 2002, at 60 (looking at 302 large mergers of public companies from 1995 to 2001). 
58 See Part I supra. 
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involved in stock-for-stock mergers fare more poorly than companies involved 
in a cash transaction in which one company purchases the other.59 
 The information technology boom of the late 1990s is replete with 
examples of failed corporate combinations.  Perhaps the most notorious of all 
corporate combinations is the merger between AOL and Time Warner.  Known 
as “the worst deal in history,”60 the combination laid waste to the market value 
of the new company and led to the departure of almost all of the executives 
responsible for the union.61  Three years after the completion of the merger, 
shareholders in AOL Time Warner had lost over $200 billion in equity value.62  
Although the company has stabilized under current leadership, its stock price 
remains mired in place, and it recently was the subject of an aborted proxy 
battle.63  The AOL-Time Warner merger has become the paradigmatic example 
of a failed corporate combination.64 
 Other high profiles deals have been less spectacularly unsuccessful, but 
unsuccessful nonetheless.  In 2002 Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly Fiorina pushed 
through a merger with Compaq despite a proxy challenge from company 
director Walter Hewlett, son of one of HP’s founders.  The media heralded the 
merger as a real victory for Fiorina, who succeeded despite litigation by 
Hewlett alleging proxy improprieties.65  However, the merger failed to 
revitalize HP, instead leading to Fiorina’s ouster in 2005.66  The merger’s 
difficulties came despite a complex plan, lauded in the press, that was designed 
to avoid the mistakes of past mergers.67  Other flawed combinations include the 
merger of Mattel and The Learning Company,68 the merger of CUC 
International and HFS (to form Cendant),69 and the merger between 
                                                          
59 See, e.g., Agrawal & Jaffe, supra note 52, at (46) (noting that “abnormal performance is worse 
for acquirers using stock-financing than for acquirers avoiding stock”); Carlos P. Maquierira et 
al., Wealth creation versus wealth redistributions in pure stock-for-stock mergers, 48 J. FIN. 
ECON. 3, 8 (1998) (noting that “research indicates that stock-for-stock mergers have 
systematically lower offer premiums for target firm stockholders, significantly negative abnormal 
returns for acquiring firm stockholders, and lower net synergistic gains created”). 
60 SWISHER, supra note 1, at 9. 
61 BRUNER, supra note 57, at 275-78. 
62 NINA MUNK, FOOLS RUSH IN: STEVE CASE, JERRY LEVIN, AND THE UNMAKING OF AOL TIME 
WARNER 277 (2004). 
63 See, e.g., Ken Auletta, The Raid, NEW YORKER, March 20, 2006, at 132. 
64 For a discussion of the AOL-Time Warner merger as an example of the dangers of the 
shareholder primacy ethos, see Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006). 
65 See Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2002 WL 818091 (April 30, 2002). 
66 Paul R. La Monica, Carly Fiorina Forced Out at HP, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 10, 2005,  
available at: http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/09/technology/hp_fiorina/index.htm?cnn=yes.  
67 Pui-Wing Tam, An Elaborate Plan Forces H-P Union To Stay on Target, WALL. ST. J., April 
28, 2003. 
68 See BRUNER, supra note 57, at 246-64. 
69 See Fanto, supra note 57, at 272-73. 
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BankAmerica and NationsBank (forming Bank of America).70  Even those who 
question whether corporate combinations have generally poor results concede 
that a significant number of them have spectacularly poor results.71 
Having found a strange pool of inefficiency in otherwise presumably 
efficient markets, scholars have sought to figure out the reasons why.  They 
have identified the following flaws in the process as potential reasons for the 
poor results. 
 2. Process Problem: Limited Information.  The process of carrying out 
a corporate combination generally follows a prescribed pattern.  Initially, talks 
are carried out at the highest levels of the corporation over the feasibility and 
desirability of a combination.  If the top officers agree to a deal, then the 
companies must secretly and expeditiously conduct due diligence using high-
level management and outside consultants.  If this hastily-conducted due 
diligence uncovers no problems, the boards approve the combination and the 
deal is announced to the public and the shareholders.  The shareholders 
generally have a few months to digest the proxy materials and media reports 
before they vote to approve or quash the merger.  If the combination receives 
shareholder and regulatory approval, the combination ultimately goes into 
effect. 
There are strategic reasons for the structure of this process.  Executives 
begin in secrecy because news of negotiations can send stock prices up.72  
Competitors may also jump into the process if word gets out, making the 
negotiations more complicated and costly.73  Failed merger negotiations can 
damage both companies’ reputations, or make one company seem weak and 
ripe for the taking.  The ramifications of such negotiations are so far-reaching 
that executives do their best to keep the discussions under tight wraps.  They 
may be so secret that only a handful of the company’s top executives even 
know about them.74 
 While this secrecy serves a purpose, it also narrowly restricts both the 
information and the perspectives that can be brought to bear.  The decision to 
actually carry out the merger is generally made at the very highest levels before 
any due diligence.  For example, in the AOL – Time Warner merger, Case and 
Levin made the decision to merge the two companies at a dinner in a private 
                                                          
70 See id. at 274. 
71 See BRUNER, supra note 57, at 95-340 (discussing particularly poor performers). 
72 See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1988) (discussing the importance of 
keeping merger negotiations secret). 
73 See Brown, supra note 6, at 93 (“Corporate officials fear that premature disclosure may result 
in a competitive disadvantage or may jeopardize continuation of the negotiations.”). 
74 See MUNK, supra note 62, at 141-43 (discussing how AOL CEO Steve Case and Time Warner 
CEO Gerald Levin met in secrecy at hotels and homes to carry out their talks). 
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room at the Rihga Royal Hotel.75  For the next two months, small groups of 
executives and advisors on both sides haggled over the final details, such as the 
number of board seats each side would have in the new company, and the 
values of shares given to each set of shareholders.76  The negotiations were 
intense, and the transaction was called off at various points.  Ultimately, Levin 
and Case made the final agreement over dinner with only two other executives 
present.77  Only four executives at Time Warner knew about the possibility of a 
merger before the agreement had been reached.78 
  While Levin may have been unusually secretive with his upper-level 
cohorts, the general rule for merger negotiations is a shroud of secrecy 
maintained by a small number of executives and advisors.79  As a result, 
corporate combinations are extremely top-down affairs.  The critical decision to 
combine is made at the very top, often by the CEO alone.  Only after the 
decision to combine has been made are larger circles of executives and advisors 
included in the planning. 
 As a result, the board and the shareholders are often handed something 
of a fait accompli.  Presumably the board has the benefit of due diligence 
conducted by investment banks which is designed to draw out any potential 
flaws in the merger.80  But those conducting the due diligence know the end 
result they are supposed to come to – allowing the combination to proceed.  
Due diligence is generally conducted by the same investment banks who have 
                                                          
75 See MUNK, supra note 62, at 143 (“By the end of the evening, Levin and Case were of one 
mind.  Together they could create the world’s most powerful and respected Internet-driven media 
and entertainment company.”). 
76 Id. at 145-56. 
77 Also present were Kenneth Novack, AOL’s vice chairman, and Richard Bressler, the head of 
Time Warner Digital Media.  Id. at 156. 
78 Id. at 158 (noting that only Bressler, Rob Marcus (who worked under Bressler), then-president 
Richard Parsons, and deputy general counsel Chris Bogart had heard of the negotiations).  The 
chief financial officer and the general counsel had no knowledge of the negotiations.  Id. at 159-
60. 
79 See, e.g., BILL VLASIC AND BRADLEY A. STERTZ, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: HOW DAIMLER-BENZ 
DROVE OFF WITH CHRYSLER 227 (2000) (“Only ten executives in Chrysler knew of the pending 
deal, and only a few more than that at Daimler.”); Press Release, Walter Hewlett Responds to 
Statement from Hewlett-Packard, Feb. 19, 2002, available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/47217/000089161802000839/f77503i1dfan14a.htm 
(“According to [Hewlett-Packard] management’s own earlier claims, the Compaq merger [with 
Hewlett-Packard] is the culmination of a surprise telephone conversation between [Hewlett-
Packard CEO] Carly Fiorina and [Compaq CEO] Michael Capellas which occurred only a few 
short months before the merger was announced.”). 
80 See, e.g., Goldman Sachs, Investment Banking, available at: 
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/client_services/investment_banking/index.html; Robert J. 
Giuffra, Jr., Note, Investment Bankers’ Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 96 
YALE L.J. 119, 121-25 (1986).  For a narrative example of the role of financial advisors in a 
merger, see Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 2001 WL 21003437, at *8-*12 (Del.Ch.,2003). 
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been working with the firms’ principals; these banks stand to earn fees if the 
combination proceeds.81  Moreover, they are often given incredibly short 
periods of time in which to conduct the diligence.  For the AOL Time Warner 
merger, the largest combination in history, the banks were given three days 
over a weekend to prepare their fairness reports for the companies’ boards.82 
 The board has the final approval of the deal before it is announced as a 
deal to the media.  As the situs of corporate power,83 the board might be 
considered the driver behind any corporate combination.  However, in reality 
the board is at best a check against top executives; at worst, the board is simply 
a rubber stamp to management’s decisions.  Much has been written about the 
role of the board in the modern corporation, and recent corporate governance 
reforms have focused on strengthening the board’s ability to monitor 
management.84  But boards are made up of top management or part-timers.  The 
part-timers may or may not be independent; so-called independent directors 
often have a powerful tie or obligation to management.85  In any event, they are 
part-timers, generally with significant responsibilities of their own to another 
firm.86  As a result, it is difficult for directors to obtain and digest the 
information necessary to monitor management with any degree of intensity. 
 These monitoring weaknesses are exacerbated by the limited timeframe 
for the board’s decision.  Management generally informs board members about 
                                                          
81 MUNK, supra note 62, at 166 (noting that the two investment banking firms involved in the 
AOL Time Warner merger each received a fee of $60 million); Giuffra, supra note 80, at 127-28 
(noting that “investment banks face strong incentives to provide opinions that serve 
management's interests”). 
82 MUNK, supra note 62, at 161-62.  As one of the bankers involved in the opinions noted, “If you 
do a deal over a weekend, you take shortcuts.  In hindsight, it was sloppy.”  Id. at 163. 
83 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 14. 
84 Commentary on the board’s role in monitoring management has been voluminous.  The 
discussion stems from the focus placed on managerial agency costs.  See Jensen & Meckling, 
supra note 2.  Many commentators have seen the board’s primary role as reducing these costs 
through monitoring.  See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 205-09 (1976) (discussing board structure to maximize monitoring).  The failures of 
the boards at Enron, WorldCom, and other failed companies has led to a reexamination of the 
board as monitor.  See, e.g., Arnoud W.A. Boot  & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate 
Perfromance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 356 (2004).   
85 See, e.g., In re Oracle Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) (holding that 
directors, who were professors at Stanford University, lacked independence as to defendant 
executives, who had promised substantial charitable gifts to the university).  For recent work on 
the function of independent directors, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors 
in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 1465 (2007), and Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=968513. 
86 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 32, at 31-37. 
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the potential deal at the last minute in order to maintain secrecy.87  Directors get 
their information about the deal from the bank’s fairness opinion, which has 
been drafted with the purpose of convincing the board to do the deal.  The 
board then has an extremely limited amount of time to decide on whether to do 
the deal.  The process is not designed to provide board members with a true 
informational picture of the combination.  It is instead designed to get the 
board’s approval at the last minute, as a prelude to the formal announcement.88 
 The announcement itself shows the front-loaded nature of the process.  
When the principals call a press conference to announce the combination, the 
deal appears to the public to be complete.89  The announcement is not framed as 
one step in a process of approval, but rather as the announcement of the actual 
deal, pending a few technicalities.  The announcement has the air of a 
celebration, and the media often joins in on the fun.90 
 In contrast to the board, shareholders are given significantly more time 
to make their decision concerning the merger and can look to the required 
proxy disclosure about the merger.  Depending on the size of the merger, the 
media may also be a source of information.  But again, the process is designed 
not to give shareholders an active role in the combination, but rather to secure 
their “yes” vote with as little controversy as possible.  State law as well as 
federal securities regulations require substantial disclosure when public 
companies solicit proxies.91  The materials tend to be quite lengthy.92  While the 
                                                          
87 The need to keep merger negotiations secret was at the heart of Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224 (1988).  The court ruled that executives were not free to lie about their negotiations, 
despite the need for secrecy.  Id. at 236.  The court reasoned that a consistent “no-comment” 
policy would protect the secrecy of the negotiations without misleading investors.  Id. at 239 
n.17.  But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An 
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1069-71 (1990) (arguing 
that secrecy is critical to the M & A market and arguing that lying should be permitted in that 
context). 
88 See, e.g., MUNK, supra note 62, at 170-74 (discussing the Time Warner board’s approval of the 
merger with AOL). 
89 For a recent example of premature closure, see Whole Foods is Buying Wild Oats, ASSOC. 
PRESS, Feb. 21, 2007 (“Whole Foods Market Inc. said Wednesday it will pay $565 million for 
Wild Oats Markets Inc., a chain of natural and organic food markets in the United States and 
Canada.”); Andrew Martin, Whole Foods Buys Smaller Rival, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007 (web 
version).  The Times changed the title in time for the print version.  Andrew Martin, Whole 
Foods Makes Offer for a Smaller Rival, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at C1. 
90 See Fanto, supra note 57, at 298 (“[T]he media has celebrated [mega-merger] transactions and 
lionized the CEOs proposing them . . . .”).  
91 State law generally requires that corporations have a duty to disclose the facts material to their 
stockholders' decisions to vote on a merger.  See, e.g., Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp., 
Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del.1994).  The test is generally stated as follows: “An omitted fact is 
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it 
important in deciding how to vote.... Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
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required disclosure is designed to provide shareholders with critical 
information, firms and their counsel generally design such disclosure in order to 
minimize risk of after-the-fact liability for improper disclosure.93  As a result, 
the disclosure tends to be a static, lump-sum document which is written 
primarily to advance the proposal while meeting legal requirements. 
 In some circumstances, particularly for larger combinations, the media 
does serve a role in investigating the proposal and serving as a check against 
management.  However, business journalists generally need some sort of hook 
in order to generate interesting coverage.  Most shareholder votes are dull 
affairs for the media, with the proposal receiving the overwhelming majority of 
votes.94  The only recent shareholder vote on a corporate combination that drew 
any press was the vote for the Hewlett-Packard and Compaq merger.  That vote 
drew attention because of Walter Hewlett’s battle against the merger and 
subsequent litigation over the proxy contest.95  Even those combinations that 
draw a significant amount of attention may not receive the appropriate 
                                                                                                                                             
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”  Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 
773, 778-79 (Del.1993) (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449, 96 
S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976)).  In Delaware, two recent cases by Vice Chancellor Leo 
Strine, Jr. have highlighted the company’s disclosure obligation to shareholders.  The vice 
chancellor enjoined a shareholder’s vote in In re Lear Corp Shareholders Litigation, 926 A.2d 94 
(Del. Ch. 2007) because the company had failed to disclose the CEO’s financial situation that 
made a buyout personally favorable to him.  See id. at 98 (concluding that shareholders were 
“entitled to know that the CEO harbored material economic motivations that differed from their 
own that could have influenced his negotiating posture”).  In In re Topps Co. Inc. Shareholders 
Litigation, 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007), Vice Chancellor Strine held that the company had failed 
to disclose several critical factors to shareholders about its proposed merger, such as the 
willingness of the acquirer to retain current management and the seriousness of a competing bid.  
In both cases, the shareholders vote was enjoined until shareholders received the appropriate 
disclosures. 
Federal securities regulations provide for more uniform disclosure through § 14 of the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act.  15 U.S.C. § 78n (2006).  Specific disclosures are provided for in 
the regulations.  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240-14a-3, §240-14a-101 (Schedule 14A) (2007). 
92 For example, the proxy solicitation materials regarding the proposed Lucent-Alcatel merger are 
175 pages plus 75 pages of appendices.  See Lucent-Alcatel Merger Proxy Statement, August 4, 
2006. 
93 Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 146 (2006) 
(noting that companies base disclosure decisions on liability concerns). 
94 Shawn Tully, Taking the Guesswork Out of Proxy Voting, CNNMoney.com, December 21, 
2006, available at: http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/-
2006/12/25/8396763/index.htm (noting that “most of the deals win shareholder approval by an 
overwhelming margin”). 
95 See, e.g., Dawn Kawamoto, Walter Hewlett Speaks Out, CNET News, at:  
http://news.com.com/2100-1001-858499.html.   Hewlett hired consulting firms, made numerous 
presentations, and took out several ads all with the purpose of persuading shareholders to vote no.  
It is estimated that both sides combined spent over  $100 million in their efforts to persuade 
shareholders.  Michael Brick & Steve Lohr, Fiorina Claims Victory in Hewlett-Compaq Proxy 
Battle, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 2002. 
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journalistic scrutiny; the press has been largely adulatory of the CEOs who can 
bring off a high-stakes merger.96 
 Thus, from start to finish the typical corporate combination is hampered 
by the absence of critical information.  At the beginning, the CEO and her 
trusted coterie must labor in secret in developing the basic decision on whether 
or not to combine.  Once the CEO has decided to go forward, the board 
generally approves the combination under hurried conditions with information 
provided by those who are already invested in the deal – the CEO, her advisors, 
and an investment bank that stands to earn hefty fees if the deal goes through.  
Then, shareholders vote after receiving a thoroughly vetted, lengthy disclosure 
document and perhaps hearing some media scrutiny.  By that point, however, 
the company itself has committed to the combination.  Given this process, there 
is real reason to question whether the information used in making the decision 
is optimal. 
 3. Process Problem: Managerial Overconfidence.  Limited information 
is not the only obstacle to efficiently negotiated corporate combinations.  
Within the negotiations themselves, commentators have long been concerned 
that top executives may not be negotiating with economic rationality.  Instead, 
there is a concern that CEOs may be acting with hubris – an inflated sense of 
their own abilities and the transactions they seek to effectuate.97  This hubris 
may be a product of two types of systematic irrationalities known as heuristics 
– the optimism bias and the commitment bias. These two heuristics form what 
one commentator has labeled the optimism-commitment “whipsaw.”98 
                                                          
96 See Fanto, supra note 57, at 298-304.  Even proxy advisors such as Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) have been strangely acquiescent towards many of the ill-founded mergers of 
recent past.  See Tully, supra note 94 (“M&A is ISS's weak point. It has a long record of 
recommending deals that were doomed from conception, and it has consistently endorsed 
mergers in which the buyer agreed to vastly overpay.”). 
97 Richard Roll has argued that corporate takeovers were generally a value-neutral proposition, 
and that therefore rational executives would not seek them out.  Roll, supra note RR1, at 198 (“It 
will be argued here that takeover gains may have been overestimated if they exist at all.”).  In 
order to explain the frequency of combinations, Roll relied not on rational market theory, but 
rather managerial hubris.  Id. at 200.  Relying on the empirical evidence that individual 
decisionmaking is not always rational, Roll noted that takeovers were an apt subject for such 
research, since takeovers reflect individual decisions. Id. at 199. Given that the data, in his view, 
did not show added value from takeovers to the acquiring firm, Roll hypothesized that managerial 
hubris – namely, the notion that their (higher) valuation of the target was better than the market’s 
(lower) valuation – was responsible for takeover activity.  Id. 
98 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997) 
[hereinafter Langevoort, Organized Illusions]. 
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 Scholars have keyed in on the effects of the optimism or over-
confidence bias on high-level corporate decisionmakers.99  The optimism bias is 
one of the most well-chronicled and intuitively-resonant biases.100 The bias 
refers to people’s irrational beliefs that they are smarter, more successful, and 
more talented than they actually are.  The quintessential optimism bias study 
concerns questions about whether one’s ability in a certain area is “above 
average.”  Subjects on average believe that their talents are above average.101  
Relatedly, evidence also suggests that individuals underestimate others’ 
abilities, especially those of their competitors.102  Optimism bias also leads 
individuals to believe that good things are more likely to happen to them, and 
bad things are less likely to happen to them, than they are to other people.103  
Another component of the optimism bias is the so-called “illusion of control.”  
This irrationality means that “people not only think that they are better than 
                                                          
99 See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 37-39 (3d ed. 
1994) (discussing overconfidence among managers). 
100 See, e.g., Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Financial Decision-Making in Markets 
and Firms: A Behavioral Perspective, in 9 HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: FINANCE 385-410 (R.A. Jarrow et al. eds., 1995) (“Perhaps the most 
robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are overconfident.”). 
101 See David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait 
Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 324, 324 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (finding that seventy 
percent of high school students in one study rated themselves above average in leadership skills, 
while only two percent ranked themselves below average on that dimension); Ola Svenson, Are 
We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 
(1981) (finding that most drivers believe they are above average drivers); D. Walton, Examining 
the Self-Enhancement Bias: Professional Truck Drivers’ Perceptions of Speed, Safety, Skill and 
Consideration, 2 TRANSP. RES. Part F 91, 99 (1999) (finding that nearly eighty percent of truck 
drivers believe they are safer drivers than the average truck driver); E. W. Zuckerman & John T. 
Jost, What Makes You Think You're So Popular? Self Evaluation Maintenance and the Subjective 
Side of the "Friendship Paradox", 64 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 207 (2001).  This tendency is sometimes 
called the “Lake Wobegon Effect.”  See The Lake Wobegon Effect, Wikipedia, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lake_Wobegon_effect. 
102 A recent example of such behavior is the case of “Rahodeb,” the online user name for Whole 
Foods CEO John Mackey.  Mackey used his anonymous online account to praise Whole Foods 
and pillory competitor Wild Oats.  David Kesmodel & John R. Wilke, Whole Foods is Hot, Wild 
Oats a Dud – So Said “Rahodeb”, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2007, at A1. 
103 Jolls et al., supra note CJ1, at 1524 ("A common feature of human behavior is overoptimism: 
People tend to think that bad events are far less likely to happen to them than to others."); Russell 
B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationalist 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1058 (2000) (describing the 
overconfidence bias as “the belief that good things are more likely than average to happen to us 
and bad things are less likely than average to happen to us”). 
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average when skill or ability is relevant to outcomes, they sometimes believe 
that they have more control over outcomes than they do.”104 
 Although the optimism bias creates an irrational perspective, social 
psychologists believe the bias may be rationally adaptive.105  A bias towards 
optimism gives the individual a reason to strive to overcome difficulties.  It 
may inspire others to similarly persist.  The illusion of control may lead 
individuals to try harder to succeed, since they have the “illusion” that success 
is within their grasp.  In fact, many believe that corporate executives are well-
served by these very traits.106  The tournaments which drive the market for 
managerial talent reinforce optimism and the illusion of control by giving those 
with such biases a greater likelihood of success.107 
 However, those same irrationalities that allow CEOs to climb the 
corporate ladder successfully also may work against the company’s fortunes 
when applied to business decisions.  And in fact, research has shown that 
executive overconfidence has demonstrated effects on corporate 
decisionmaking.  According to the research, executive overconfidence leads to 
excessive entry into unfamiliar markets,108 overpaying in the context of 
auctions,109 an overreliance on the executive’s personal information and 
                                                          
104  Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 288 (2001).  See generally Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of 
Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 (1975). 
105 See, e.g., Pamela C. Regan et al., Unrealistic Optimism: Self-Enhancement or Person 
Positivity?, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1073, 1079-80 (1995) (finding that 
unrealistic optimism resulted in a greater chance of experiencing positive, future life outcomes); 
Shelley E. Taylor & Peter M. Gollwitzer, Effects of Mindset on Positive Illusions, 69 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 213, 224- 25 (1995) (demonstrating that people tend to use 
positive thinking when implementing goals). 
106 Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent 
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 
93 GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004) (noting that “over-optimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a 
deep capacity for ethical self-deception are favored in corporate promotion tournaments, so that 
people who possess them are disproportionately represented in executive suites”). 
107 E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-competition: Corporate 
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968 (2002); Troy A. Paredes, 
Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate 
Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673 (2005); Anand Mohan Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, 
Rationality, Overconfidence & Leadership (working paper), available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=244999.  For a brief overview of the tournament for managerial talent, 
see Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 
EMORY L.J. 1557, 1586-87 (2005). 
108 Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental 
Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999). 
109 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE (1992). 
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perspective,110 and a belief that the market is undervaluing the executive’s own 
company.111  As a result, executive overconfidence may lead to a consistent 
pattern of market irrationality, resulting in inefficiencies. 
 Furthermore, overconfidence can combine with another behavioral 
heuristic to do even more damage to corporate decisionmaking.112  Social 
psychologists have identified a human tendency to stay with a project or 
endeavor past when it remains profitable or beneficial to do so.  This reluctance 
to abandon prior sunk costs is known as the commitment bias.113  Studies have 
demonstrated this bias within the corporate world.114  When commitment bias 
teams up with the optimism bias, executives will not only make overly 
optimistic choices, but they will also stay with those choices long after the 
evidence should show them the error of their ways – the aforementioned 
“optimism-commitment whipsaw.”115  The exacerbated effects of these 
irrationalities may lead to unethical behavior, as executives realize too late how 
bad the situation is and desperately try to get themselves out of it.116 
 It is easy to see how these biases may lead to poor decisionmaking in 
the context of corporate combinations.  At the beginning of negotiations, the 
CEO and just a few trusted advisors are put in the position of determining 
whether the combination makes sense, and on what terms.117  The success of 
the combination, in the eyes of the CEO, may largely depend on his or her own 
finesse and ability in making the transaction work.  The overconfidence bias is 
thus likely to make the CEO more likely to believe that he or she can make the 
combination a success.  Once the two sides agree to the transaction, the 
commitment bias takes over.  Even though only the CEO and a small group of 
executives have decided on the combination, in their minds the commitment 
has been made.  Thus, they are prone to push hard for the deal and genuinely (if 
even irrationally) believe that the deal will make the corporation better off.  The 
commitment bias will then affect the board’s judgment once it has decided in 
                                                          
110 Antonio Bernardo & Ivo Welch, On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs, 10 J. 
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 301 (2001) 
111 J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33 (2002); Ulrike 
Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661 
(2005). 
112 See Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 98. 
113 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 767 (2002). 
114 See, e.g., Barry M. Staw, Rationality and Justification in Organizational Life, in 2 RESEARCH 
IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 45 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1980); Charles R. 
Schwenk, Information, Cognitive Biases, and Commitment to a Course of Action, 11 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 298 (1986). 
115 Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 98, at 147. 
116 Id. 
117 See BRUNER, supra note 57, at 347 (“Overoptimism (also called ‘hubris’) is pervasive at the 
start of most of these failed deals.”). 
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favor of the transaction.  These players are thus more likely to stick with their 
decision even if further evidence changes the cost-benefit analysis that a bias-
free actor would make. 
 As noted earlier, scholars have particularly noted the presence of 
management overconfidence and hubris in the market for corporate control.118  
Unlike other areas of corporate conduct, the finance literature has made a place 
for behavioral irrationalities such as overconfidence in large-scale mergers and 
acquisitions.  These irrationalities place a further burden on the combination 
process. 
 4. Process Problem: Managerial Financial Incentives.  In additional to 
irrational biases in favor of the combination, managers and directors will often 
have quite rational biases in favor of executing the deal.  Because combinations 
are a time of upheaval and reorganization, they are also a time to revisit the 
positions and compensations of the executives and directors who run each 
company.  It should not be surprising that companies often make large payouts 
at these times – payouts that may not be justified under an arms-length system 
of compensation negotiation. 
 The payments come on all sides and for all different reasons. When a 
small company is being merged into a bigger company, the so-called “target” 
company will often pay its departing executives a sizeable sum.119  This 
payment is justified as compensation for a loss or downgrade of position, and it 
may be necessary to move a profitable combination forward.  But it also means 
that these managers and directors can exact a price for their acquiescence to the 
plan – a premium unavailable to most employees.  And that premium may be 
excessive, and against shareholder interests.  Sometimes this payment is made 
by the target company itself, while in other cases the acquiring company pays 
the sum.  In both cases, there is concern that the executive will become too 
attached to the payout and will fail to follow shareholder interests.120 
                                                          
118 In his article on CEO overconfidence, Troy Paredes turns repeatedly to corporate 
combinations for examples of overconfidence at work.  See Paredes, supra note 107, at 674-75 
(discussing Comcast’s bid to acquire Disney); id. at 692 (discussing VeriSign’s acquisition of 
Network Solutions); id. at 745 (discussing a remedy against overconfidence in the context of 
“big-ticket items, such as significant mergers [and] acquisitions”).  Another recent study found 
evidence of behavioral heuristics and biases in the context of required disclosure documents for 
the thirty biggest stock-for-stock mergers over a three-year period.  See James A. Fanto, Quasi-
Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1333, 1354-74 (2001). 
119 These may be referred to as “golden parachutes,” since they insure the executives a soft 
landing after they have been jettisoned by the company.  
120 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 32, at 91 (relating the story of a $170 million “retention pool” 
for MCI executives promised by British Telecommunication in a proposed merger; the executives 
then continued to support the merger even after BT reduced its offer by 20 percent). 
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 Companies also give executive bonuses when they are on the acquiring 
end of the deal.  According to one study, the acquiring company’s CEO 
received a gratuitous multimillion-dollar bonus in about 40 percent of 
acquisitions.121  The bonuses are often given as cash for work that falls within 
the overall job expectations of a chief executive officer.  Acquisition bonuses 
are a critical example of the “managerial power” thesis: these bonuses are not 
the result of compensation negotiations but rather the CEO’s power over the 
board.122  In addition, they provide a powerful incentive for executives to 
pursue acquisitions.  Another recent study has found that executives’ decisions 
to expand company size are associated with increases in subsequent pay.123  
There is a real concern that “the promise – or even the expectation – of an 
acquisition bonus could exacerbate managers’ excessive acquisition 
tendencies.”124 
 In addition, shareholders may not know ahead of time whether the 
board will view the merger and its implementation as a justification for a 
substantial bonus after the merger has been approved.  In his campaign against 
the Hewlett-Packard merger with Compaq, renegade director Walter Hewlett 
raised this issue explicitly.  In a report distributed as part of his campaign, 
Hewlett accused the company of “hiding the ball” with respect to post-merger 
compensation.125  Because he believed that management was not forthcoming, 
he leaked board discussions that had contemplated compensation packages 
totaling more than $115 million.126  It is, of course, highly unusual to have a 
dissident board member leak such information; shareholders are generally not 
privy to such understandings or discussions. 
 Given the propensity for managers to use combinations as a reason for 
higher pay, it is no wonder corporate combinations themselves have come 
under greater scrutiny.127  Even if such bonuses are based on desert, they still 
can provide a powerful incentive to initiate or continue with deals that should 
not be done. 
                                                          
121 Yaniv Grinstein & Paul Hribar, CEO Compensation and Incentives – Evidence from M&A 
Bonuses, 73 J. FIN ECON. 119 (2004). 
122 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 32, at 127-29. 
123 Lucien A. Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, Firm Expansion and CEO Pay, November 2005, 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=838245. 
124 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 32, at 128. 
125 Walter B. Hewlett et al., Proxy Materials, Report on Executive Compensation, Feb. 26, 2002, 
available at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/47217/000089161802000923/-
f77503j7dfan14a.htm 
126 Id.  
127 Gretchen Morgenson answered the title of her article “What Are Mergers Good For?” with the 
answer, “Not much, unless you’re one of the bankers or executives whose compensation goes up 
with every deal you do.”  Morgenson, supra note 31, at 56. 
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 5. Process Problem: Deal Protection Provisions.  In addition to the 
information and behavioral problems that can lead to bad corporate 
combinations, many firms find themselves locked into a decision not only by 
the commitment bias, but also by contractual provisions.  Deal protection 
provisions include agreements to sell certain assets to the bidding company at a 
reduced price if the transaction does not go through; agreements to submit the 
transaction to the shareholders, even if the board changes its mind; termination 
fees if the transaction does not occur; and side agreements with key 
shareholders as to their votes.  Such provisions have been the subject of 
considerable judicial consideration and academic discussion for their role in 
discouraging hostile takeovers.128 
 There is substantial literature in support of deal-protection provisions: 
such provisions protect the initial bidder and may increase the likelihood that 
bidders will enter into combination agreements in the first place.129  However, 
such provisions also extract a price: they make it much more difficult for 
boards and shareholders to get out of a deal after the fact.  In fact, deal 
protection provisions are often written to provide protection to the disappointed 
firm even if the shareholders reject the proposed combination.130  Certainly deal 
protection provisions offer an opportunity for managers and directors to make it 
more painful for shareholders to reject a proposed merger.  The costs of such 
proposals have led some commentators to recommend more judicial skepticism 
of such provisions.131   
 
C. The Employee Referendum as Information Generator 
                                                          
128 See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 939 (2003) (holding certain 
deal protection provisions to be invalid); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements 
and Lock-Ups in Negotiated Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239 (1990); John C. Coates IV & 
Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307 
(2000); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1539 (1996). 
129 See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of 
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 595-615 (2003) (arguing that restriction on 
deal protection devices may reduce shareholder welfare by decreasing a target board’s options in 
the midst of competing deals); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo , What Happened 
in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key 
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1461 (2005) (“I think most objective observers believe 
that the majority decision [in Omnicare] was simply wrong.”). 
130 See, e.g., Lucent-Alcatel Merger Proxy Statement, supra note LAMPS, at 8 (“A fee of $250 
million, which is referred to as the initial termination fee, will be payable by one party to the 
other party if: (a) either party terminates the merger agreement because the paying party’s 
shareholders failed to approve the merger . . . and prior to the paying party’s shareholders 
meeting, a competing acquisition proposal was made known to the paying party”).   
131 Coates & Subramanian, supra note 128, at 389 (arguing that “lockups can in fact protect deals 
from third-party higher-value bidders, thereby reducing allocational efficiency in the market for 
corporate control”). 
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 An overview of the corporate combination process reveals problematic 
tendencies toward inefficient behavior.  The combination begins with 
discussions between a small group of executives at the highest level, who are 
by necessity acting on limited information.  They soon become locked into the 
deal, however, and the other participants in the process – namely, the directors 
and the shareholders – often play a purely reactionary role.  The process would 
become more efficient with more information, particularly information from 
players who are not tied into the success of the combination. 
 Employees are a natural fit for this role.  In the 1980s and 1990s both 
academic and popular business literature discussed the ways in which firms 
could take better advantage of the information held by employees.132  The 
success of Japanese businesses led many to investigate ways in which Japanese 
firms sought to work with employees to better design the business.133  Groups 
such as “quality circles” and “quality improvement teams” were heralded as a 
way of getting workers to contribute their knowledge to the corporation.134  
Such methods stood in opposition to hierarchical management structures and 
the Taylorist method of production, which held that managers generated the 
information and disseminated down the ladder.135 
  The employee referendum would be one way of tapping into this 
employee knowledge base.  The referendum would ask employees whether they 
thought the proposed merger should go through.  The results of the referendum 
itself – the percentage voting for, the percentage voting against – would be 
useful information.  Beyond that, however, those results would in turn lead to 
efforts to explain the results.  These explanatory efforts would generate more 
information about the merger and its wisdom. 
                                                          
132 For a sampling of the legal academic literature, much of it involving employee ownership, see 
MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (1995); THE NEW RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN 
CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (Margaret M. Blair & Thomas A. Kochan eds. 2000); 
JOSEPH R. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? (1988); HENRY HANSMANN, 
THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 66-119 (1996); SAUL A. RUBENSTEIN & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, 
LEARNING FROM SATURN: POSSIBILITIES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EMPLOYEE 
RELATIONS (2001); PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990); Alan Hyde, In Defense of 
Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159, 160 (1991).  
133 See, e.g., ROBERT E. COLE, WORK, MOBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
AMERICAN AND JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1980).  Enthusiasm for Japanese production methods 
continues today.  See Jon Gertner, From 0 to 60 to World Domination, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), 
Feb. 18, 2007, at 34. 
134 See, e.g., JOSEPH M. JURAN, QUALITY BY DESIGN (1992); DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING THE 
WORKPLACE: HOW BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN (1995); PAUL LILLRANK & NORIAKI 
KANO, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT: QUALITY CONTROL CIRCLES IN JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1989).  
135 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and 
Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 143-46 (1988) (discussing Taylorism in the 
workplace). 
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 At first glance, the results of the referendum itself may not seem all that 
important.  After all, it is a non-binding referendum that simply says whether 
the employees believe the merger is a worthwhile endeavor.  Much of this 
information, it could be argued, is accessible simply by asking the employees.  
However, although managers may be able to get a general sense of employee 
sentiment through internal channels, that anecdotal information is not the same 
as a referendum.  Anecdotal information may be insightful, but it may also vary 
wildly from the actual reality.  Managers cannot be expected to contact every 
employee about their thoughts on the combination.136  Given the lack of 
unionization among private sector employees, most companies will not have 
union representatives that they can turn to as barometers of employee 
sentiment.137  In addition, managers will be primed to read employee sentiment 
as supporting the merger, since they have already bought into it.  Psychological 
biases will lead managers to overvalue employee support and undervalue 
employee criticism.138  In addition, employees will be more likely to publicly 
support the combination, whatever their own views, if they think managers are 
looking for positive feedback.139  Employees might be fearful that failure to 
support the combination will be punished.  Finally, even if managers could get 
a realistic read on employee sentiment, they will in all likelihood keep that 
information to themselves.  They are unlikely to share the information with 
directors, the shareholders, or the public, particularly if employees are generally 
unfavorable about the transaction. 
 The difficulties in determining employee sentiment without a 
referendum were highlighted in the recent proxy battle over the Hewlett-
Packard (H-P) merger with Compaq.  Both sides in that battle claimed that 
employees agreed with their position.  In fact, H-P shareholder and merger 
opponent David W. Packard commissioned independent polls of employees on 
the merger.140  The polls were conducted by surveying residents in three towns 
that were known to have high concentrations of H-P employees.141  The results 
showed that employees surveyed (which included retirees) were against the 
                                                          
136 Cf. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 205 (2004) (noting that “with so many 
layers separating the men in the executive suit from workers in the field, it was hard for top 
executives to know if the picture they had of their own corporation resembled reality” (citing 
THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE (1982))). 
137 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, Union Membership in 2006, 
Table 3, January 25, 2007, available at: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm (union 
members account for only 7.4% of the private workforce). 
138 SeePart II.B.3. supra (discussing the optimism bias). 
139  Cf. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 11, at 141 (citing research that shows that employees 
want joint participation with management on worker organizations). 
140 David W. Packard, The Case for the H-P Way, Advertisement, available at: 
http://www.crn.com/it-channel/18837628. 
141 Id. 
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merger by a 2-to-1 ratio.142  However, Hewlett-Packard claimed that it had 
internal survey data demonstrating that more than sixty percent of employees 
were in favor of the merger.143  Both sides attacked the other’s data.144  In both 
cases, however, the results reflected surveys of small portions of employees – 
not comprehensive efforts to determine what employees thought as a collective 
whole. 
 In addition to providing a definitive, quantitative account of employee 
sentiment, the referendum will then generate a second level of information: 
reporting on the referendum’s results and the reasons behind those results.  
Once the votes are counted, the results will trigger a discussion about the 
meaning behind the numbers. They will provide for a more grounded dialogue 
amongst employees, managers, directors, and shareholders.  Moreover, instead 
of merely relying on anecdotal accounts from individual employees, members 
of the press will have a concrete figure to discuss and dissect.  They can then 
look to the company, employees, and analysts for explanations of the result. 
Much of this information will still be anecdotal, but it will be in response to a 
firm-wide survey of employees.  It will be grounded in a more scientific slice of 
reality.145  This second level of information generation will add an important 
layer of context to the raw numbers. 
 Having identified the type of information that the referendum will 
generate, we are still left with determining the usefulness of this information.  
What does a vote for or against the combination say about that combination?  
What are the reasons behind it?  An employee’s vote can likely be explained by 
three different general areas of concerns: business judgment concerns, 
employee-related concerns, and managerial opportunism concerns.  Some 
employees may vote based solely on one of these reasons, while others may 
cast their vote based on all three.  Each category will have different benefits and 
uses for management, directors, and shareholders.  But this is the type of 
information that is likely to bubble up in the referendum’s wake. 
                                                          
142 Id. 
143 Peter Burrows, What Price Victory at Hewlett-Packard?, BUSINESSWEEK, April 1, 2002. 
144 H-P CEO Carly Fiorina referred to the Packard-commissioned polls as “employee surveys in a 
small town in Oregon with 500 employees and half of them are retirees.”  Fiorina Says Pay No 
Heed to Hewlett, ZDNET, Feb. 28, 2002, available at: 
http://www.zdnet.co.uk/misc/print/0,1000000169,2105201-39001084c,00.htm.  David Packard 
attacked the company’s surveys for being biased, directed at certain employees, and non-
confidential.  Packard, supra note DWP1. 
145 For example, stories about employee discontent will be more meaningful than simply the 
traditional “handful of disgruntled employees” accounts.  See, e.g., Alorie Gilbert, PeopleSoft 
Customers, Employees Weigh Deal, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 14, 2004, available at: 
http://news.com.com/2100-1014_3-5490219.html (“Several employees interviewed at the firm's 
Pleasanton campus on Monday, each of whom requested anonymity, expressed concerns about 
the deal.”). 
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1. Business-Judgment Concerns.  Business judgment concerns reflect a 
judgment on the part of employees about the business sense of the combination.  
This judgment may be reflected in majority support for the combination, which 
would signal agreement with the managers’ business judgment, or it may be 
reflected in majority disapproval of the combination, which would sign 
disagreement with the managers’ judgment.  Employees may agree or disagree 
with managers on a variety of business-related judgments: the culture of the 
other firm, the value of the other firm’s business or technology, the need for a 
combination to expand the business or enter new markets.  A vote that centered 
on these concerns would generate further information about these business-
related issues. 
Information generated in this category is obviously useful to all three 
groups of decision-makers: managers, directors, and shareholders.  Managers 
will benefit by getting feedback on their planned combination.  They may 
choose to abandon the plan if employees raise significant enough concerns, or 
employee support may bolster their confidence in the plan.  Even if they 
disagree with the employees’ judgment, knowing those concerns will make it 
easier for management to adapt the plan so that, down the road, employees buy 
into the new arrangement.  Employee participation in and adaptation to the 
combination are perhaps the most important factor in achieving a successful 
new company.146 
Directors would benefit from the information in their role as stewards 
of the transaction and the firm.  Although directors will have approved of the 
merger before the referendum, they maintain the ability to withdraw the 
combination from consideration by the shareholders or to recommend a “no” 
vote to the shareholders.  Some merger agreements contain a “fiduciary out” 
clause, in which the board is given the right to withdraw from the agreement if 
their fiduciary duties as directors require the deal to be nixed.147  If employee 
                                                          
146 BRUNER, supra note 57. 
147 See, e.g., William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and Why of an 
Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 654 (2000) (“A fiduciary out typically provides that if 
some triggering event occurs (often the receipt of a defined ‘Superior Offer’ and sometimes the 
receipt from the corporation's outside lawyers of an opinion to the effect that the board must as a 
matter of fiduciary duty do an act that the contract forbids or must not do an act the contract 
requires), then the doing of that act (or the refraining from doing a required act) will not 
constitute a breach.”); Michael A. Stanchfield, Fiduciary Duties in Negotiated Acquisitions: 
Questioning the Legal Requirement for "Outs," 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2261, 2263-66 (2001) 
(discussing the prevalence and varieties of such “outs”).  There is some suggestion that a 
“fiduciary out” is necessary under Delaware law.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 
818 A.2d 914, 939 (Del. 2003) (“The fiduciary duties of a director are unremitting and must be 
effectively discharged in the specific context of the actions that are required with regard to the 
corporation or its stockholders as circumstances change.”); Edward D. Herlihy, Takeover Law 
and Practice 2005, 1528 PLI/CORP. 341, Jan. 25, 2006 (“Omnicare's emphasis on the 
‘unremitting’ nature of the board's duties to obtain the best price, and its flat per se rule that 
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referenda are implemented, perhaps directors will stipulate that employee 
disapproval gives a board the discretion to terminate the agreement.148  An 
employee vote disapproving the deal, together with the information supporting 
that vote, may be sufficient to change a board’s mind about the wisdom of the 
transaction.  
Finally, shareholders might also look to the employees’ business 
judgment in casting their vote about the proposed combination.  For reasons 
discussed above, management and directors might not give the proper weight to 
negative information generated by the employee referendum about the deal’s 
business impact.149  Executives and the board will have already formulated and 
executed the deal and are then looking for shareholders to go along with the 
plan.  Their buy-in, combined with behavioral heuristics, may lead them to 
irrationally ignore or discount business judgment concerns generated from 
employees.  Shareholders, however, will not be subject to these irrationalities 
and thus could vote against the plan based on the employees’ business 
judgment concerns. 
Indeed, in the most hotly contested merger proxy contest in recent 
memory, both sides looked to employees to bolster their claims about the 
wisdom of the proposed transaction.  In the battle over the Hewlett-Packard 
merger with Compaq, both management and the dissident group argued that 
employees agreed with their position.  In presentations and advertising, Walter 
Hewlett emphasized that H-P employees were against the merger; one 
advertisement stated, “If employees are opposed to the Compaq merger at a rate 
of almost 2 to 1, what hope is there for the Compaq merger?”150  In addition, 
both the dissident group and David Packard quoted employee responses 
discussing the merits of the merger proposal.151 
 Even if these scenarios are possible, one might question whether 
employees would actually have the business judgment necessary to detect and 
then vote against a proposed deal based simply on the merits.  Firms generally 
do not call upon the combined judgment of employees in making business 
decisions; instead, executives are hired to make these big-picture decisions 
using their access to both public and confidential sources of information along 
with their intelligence and experience.  The likelihood is slim to none, it might 
be argued, that employees as a whole would actually exercise better business 
                                                                                                                                             
replaces previous factual, case-by-case analysis, may suggest that contracts will require some 
form of fiduciary out to pass muster in the future.”). 
148 Of course, canceling the deal would likely result in a termination fee, but agreements 
generally require such fees even if shareholders vote down the proposed combination. 
149 See Part II.B supra. 
150 Walter B. Hewlett et al., Advertisement, Feb. 28, 2002, available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/47217/000089161802000966/a77503k4dfan14a.htm.  
151 Id.; Packard, supra note DWP1. 
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judgment on a deal than management and the cadre of professionals who advise 
them. 
 However, this conventional wisdom about employees’ judgment may 
be overstated and, in fact, misplaced.  As discussed earlier, firms are now using 
methods to draw more and more information from their employees.152  Much of 
this activity is focused on the lower level, such as the shop floor.153  However, 
employees may also have collective wisdom on big-picture items as well.  In 
The Wisdom of Crowds, James Surowiecki argues that firms should tap 
employees not only for bottom-level productivity concerns, but also for top-
level problems of cognition.154 
 
These are the problems that define corporate strategy and tactics.  
They include everything from deciding among potential new 
products to building new factories to forecasting demand to 
setting prices to contemplating mergers.  Today, in most 
corporations, the answers to these problems are ultimately 
decided by one man: the CEO.  Yet they are the problems that . . 
. are probably most amenable to collective decision making, 
even if the collective is a relatively small group.155 
 
Surowiecki goes on to promote the use of “methods of aggregating collective 
wisdom” in making strategic decisions.156  In an age which saw the sharp rise 
and swifter fall of Enron, the allegedly “smartest guys in the room,”157 the 
luster of professional expertise in strategic decisionmaking has lost some of its 
shine.158  In its place, the use of collective intelligence, through such 
mechanisms as organizational structure, referenda, and information markets, 
has enjoyed a recent surge in interest and popularity.159  Similarly, the wisdom 
                                                          
152 See Part II.C supra. 
153 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: 
POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 231-36 (1984) (discussing the practice of “flexible specialization” 
on the shop floor). 
154 SUROWIECKI, supra note 136. 
155 Id. at 216. 
156 Id. at 220-21.  Surowiecki specifically discusses the uses of trading markets drawing a diverse 
mix of employees as methods of assessing projected sales and regulatory decisions.  Id. at 221-
22. 
157 BETHANY MCLEAN AND PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING 
RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003). 
158 See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, The Talent Myth, NEW YORKER, July 22, 2002 (arguing for 
organizational structure, not individual intelligence, as the way to institutional success, and 
criticizing the “McKinsey” approach to employee hiring).   
159 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69 (2006); 
Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2004); Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd 
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of the average employees has been (again) heralded in recent popular business 
literature.160 
  Of course, employees may be wrong.  But if a majority of employees 
vote “no” based on business-judgment concerns, then at least management has 
an awareness of the problem and the opportunity to respond to those concerns.  
A more vigorous debate of the wisdom of the merger increases the likelihood 
that the eventual decision will be the most efficient one. 
 2. Employee-Related Concerns.  The vote might also reflect employee-
specific concerns about the proposed transaction.  For example, employees 
might vote for a merger because the merger will offer greater opportunities for 
employees to move up in the organization.  Conversely, employees might vote 
against a combination because of proposed layoffs or closings that the 
combination would engender.  Unlike business judgment concerns, employee-
specific concerns specifically relate to the employee’s interests and may be 
counter to the interests of managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders in the 
firm. 
A “no” vote from a majority of employees may signal specific 
employee-related concerns about the proposed transaction.  Most obviously, 
employees may be concerned about lay-offs or terminations that would result 
from post-combination redundancies.  In fact, the very reason for the deal may 
be the cost savings from a reduced payroll.  Employee rejection of such a deal 
would be unsurprising and perhaps not all that illuminating to decisionmakers 
within the firm. 
 However, for those who believe in a stakeholder or “mediating 
hierarchy” theory of board governance, an employee referendum offers a way 
to quantify the breadth of employee sentiment for and against a proposed 
transaction.  As discussed earlier,161 stakeholder theorists believe that the role 
of the board is to balance between the concerns of the various stakeholders in 
the firm.  Unlike shareholder primacists, who believe that directors must 
maximize residual returns to shareholders, stakeholder theorists argue that 
boards must generally maximize returns across all of the stakeholders to the 
firm. 
                                                                                                                                             
Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance, Working Paper, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=928896; Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Tiresias and the 
Justices: Using Information Markets to Predict Supreme Court Decisions, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
1141 (2006). 
160 See, e.g., ORI BRAFMAN & ROD A. BECKSTROM, THE STARFISH AND THE SPIDER: THE 
UNSTOPPABLE POWER OF LEADERLESS ORGANIZATIONS 181-91 (2006); ADRIAN GOSTICK & 
CHESTER ELTON, THE INVISIBLE EMPLOYEE: REALIZING THE HIDDEN POTENTIAL IN EVERYONE 
(2006). 
161 See Part II.A supra. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMPLOYEE REFERENDA 34  
 Scholars disagree whether existing corporate law is more oriented 
toward shareholder primacy or stakeholder theory.162  One clear example of 
stakeholder theory in action, however, is the state corporate constituency 
statute.  Over half of the states163 have a provision allowing directors to make 
certain decisions based on the needs of all corporate constituencies.  New York, 
for example, provides that when considering a change or potential change in the 
control of the corporation, a director “shall be entitled to consider” the effects 
that the corporation's actions may have upon the corporation’s various 
stakeholders, including current employees, retired employees, customers, 
creditors, and the communities in which it does business.164  The purpose of the 
statute is to give directors the freedom to consider the impact of a control 
transaction165 on stakeholders other than shareholders.  Constituency statutes 
have generated a voluminous literature both in favor and against such 
statutes.166 
 The most generally recognized weakness of the constituency statute is 
the lack of accountability for its use.  Directors are only given authorization to 
consider the needs of other constituencies; they are not obligated to do so.167  
Directors are not legally accountable to any of the stakeholders for failure to 
consider their needs.168  Thus, critics fear that constituency statutes will be used 
                                                          
162 Compare Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 43, at 441 (“[A]s a consequence of both logic 
and experience, there is convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the 
pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to 
shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests.”),  with Jill E. Fisch, 
Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 
650 (2006) (“Although corporate law mandates managerial fidelity to shareholder interests both 
through shareholder election rights and through fiduciary principles, existing law does not 
actually require officers and directors to make operational decisions with the sole objective of 
shareholder wealth maximization.”). 
163 See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006) (finding that thirty-one states have 
constituency statutes). 
164 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2006). 
165 The statute states that “[f]or purposes of this paragraph, ‘control’ shall mean the possession, 
directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies 
of the corporation, whether through the ownership of voting stock, by contract, or otherwise.”  Id. 
166 For a recent summary of the arguments for and against constituency statutes, Brett H. 
McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1227, 1232-36 (2004). 
167 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing 
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 579 (1992) [hereinafter Mitchell, 
Framework]. 
168 For example, New York’s statute states: “Nothing in this paragraph shall create any duties 
owed by any director to any person or entity to consider or afford any particular weight to any of 
the foregoing or abrogate any duty of the directors, either statutory or recognized by common law 
or court decisions.” N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2006). 
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as a “fig leaf” by boards to act in their own interests, rather than in 
stakeholders’ interests.169  Despite numerous proposals to beef up constituency 
statutes,170 they remain in their largely hortatory form. 
 Employee referenda are a way of putting more substance into 
constituency statutes.  In their current form, directors could cite to vague or 
anecdotal employee concerns in order to approve, nix or counter a proposed 
corporate combination.  With an employee referendum in place, directors 
would have a concrete representation of employee sentiment upon which to 
base their actions, at least for that constituency.  The information generated in 
response to the referendum would also be useful to directors in formulating 
their constituency-balancing.  By providing quantitative evidence about 
employee views, the referendum would provide a better foundation for director 
decisions based on the stakeholder framework. 
 It is true that constituency statutes were created to allow boards to fight 
hostile takeovers, and such takeovers do not generally involve shareholder 
votes.  Instead, the hostile bidder makes a tender offer for the company which 
the target board may then try to defeat.  However, such statutes apply to any 
change of control situation, which may include a company being taken over by 
another pursuant to a merger or sale of substantially all assets.  A board could 
use the employee referendum to shut down or back out of a deal that employees 
disliked.  And it could do so based simply on employee-related concerns.171   
 More generally, the employee referendum supports the stakeholder 
model by looking for input from stakeholders other than shareholders on 
critical decisions of corporate strategy.  Employees would have the opportunity 
                                                          
169 Letter from Joseph Grundfest, Commissioner, Securities Exchange Commission, to Mario 
Cuomo, Governor for New York (June 6, 1989), cited in Mitchell, Framework, supra note LM2, 
at 580 & n.4.  See also Mitchell, Framework, supra note 167, at 581 (“The principal criticism of 
rejecting this traditional relationship is that authorizing the board to consider constituencies that 
have no monitoring or enforcement powers would leave the board accountable to nobody.”); 
Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (“A stakeholder measure of managerial accountability could leave 
managers so much discretion that managers could easily pursue their own agenda, one that might 
maximize neither shareholder, employee, consumer, nor national wealth, but only their own.”).  
Even constituency statute proponents have deep concerns about this problem.  See David Millon, 
Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE 
CORPORATE LAW at 1, 30 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (“However attractive [the 
constituency] model might be in theory, communitarian scholars have yet to show persuasively 
that it could function effectively in practice.”); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as 
Stakeholders Under State Non-Shareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 70 
(1991) (noting that constituency statutes provide “very little” actual protection to employees and 
other constituents). 
170 See, e.g., Mitchell, Framework, supra note 167. 
171 A board could also commission their own referendum in the midst of a hostile tender offer to 
canvass employee feelings on the proposed takeover.  
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to voice their own, potentially self-interested concerns, and directors could take 
those concerns into account.  The referendum invigorates the stakeholder model 
by offering a concrete way for employees to reach the board with their input.  
Under stakeholder theory, directors are obliged to take this input seriously; 
directors could even incorporate the referendum into the process of the 
transaction itself.172  Thus, even where employees simply vote based on their 
own interests, the employee referendum would be useful to corporate 
decisionmakers.173 
 3. Managerial Opportunism Concerns.  Thirdly, a vote might reflect 
employee concerns related to management and managerial opportunism.  Even 
if the combination makes sense from a business judgment perspective, 
employees might still vote against the merger if they believe management has 
used the transaction as an opportunity to extract unnecessary rents from the 
firm. 
As discussed earlier,174 corporate combinations offer management the 
opportunity to extract particularized rents.  Because the combination requires 
some degree of reshuffling, both of the corporate structure and the managerial 
hierarchy, the combination will generally require changes in managerial 
positions as well as compensation.  The combination is often an opportunity for 
management to give itself bonuses for pulling off the merger.  If the new 
corporation must offer new stock, performance-related pay packages will be 
restructured to accommodate the new system.  These new packages often 
provide benefits to managers, such as accelerated vesting of stock options, new 
options packages, or new grants of stock or restricted stock.175  Even base pay 
may be changed to reflect the new corporate culture of the combined entity. 
                                                          
172 For example, as noted earlier, the transaction agreement could allow the board to terminate the 
merger based on stakeholder concerns, such as those expressed in the referendum.  But since the 
board would not be compelled to do anything based on the referendum, it would still satisfy those 
scholars who believe that directors must have unfettered discretion to implement policy.  See, 
e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 42, at 254 (“Where progressives have argued that corporate law 
ought to be reformed to make directors more accountable to stakeholders, the mediating approach 
suggests that directors should not be under direct control of either shareholders or other 
stakeholders.”). 
173 The information would also be useful for outside unions and other employee activists who 
would advocate against the change based on employee preferences.  Katherine Stone’s “citizen 
union” covering employee concerns in a certain region might find the information particularly 
useful.  See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR 
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 229-30 (2004) (“Citizen unions could act at the local and regional 
level to pressure corporations to become good corporate citizens.”). 
174 See Part II.B.4. supra. 
175 For an extreme example, see Scott Thurm, The “I Must Do A Merger” Bonus, WALL ST. J., 
April 6, 2004, at C1 (discussing a CEO bonus that was dependent on the company’s “entry into 
new businesses by means of acquisitions”). 
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 While directors may be expected to police instances of excessive 
compensation, there are a variety of reasons to doubt their effectiveness.  First, 
the directors themselves may be in on the deal.  Just as managerial reshuffling 
can lead to payouts, so too directorial reshuffling.  The firm may decide to 
award bonuses to directors as well as managers.176  Second, directors may 
already feel beholden to managers.  Top-level executives have significant 
power over the board nomination and reelection process177 as well as the 
directorial compensation process.178  Personal ties help cement the feelings of 
loyalty and friendship.179  Third, the merger process is so complicated and 
hurried that directors may focus on the big picture and neglect to work through 
the complicated compensation details.  As discussed, managers generally turn 
to the board for approval of these transactions at the last minute.  As they 
generally do, boards may trust that investment bankers, compensation 
consultants, and other advisors have dealt with the compensation issue 
sufficiently.180 
 In the context of a merger or acquisition, shareholders are empowered 
to protect against such compensation themselves by vetoing the proposed 
combination.  However, shareholders have to know about the problem in order 
to police it.  Increasingly, shareholder service providers are taking steps to 
police management and inform large institutional shareholders about problems 
or corruption.181  But such services are not complete.  We are still far from a 
world in which shareholders are completely informed about their firms and 
have the power and incentives to act on that information.182 
                                                          
176 See also Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the issues 
surrounding a stock option grant to directors).   
177 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 32, at 25-27. 
178 Id. at 27-31 (discussing how top-level managers can financially reward directors). 
179 Brian G.M. Main, Charles A. O’Reilly III & James Wade, The CEO, the Board of Directors, 
and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 INDUS. & CORP 
CHANGE 292 (1995). 
180 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 32, at 37-39.  See also In re Walt Disney Shareholders’ 
Litigation, 2005 WL 2056651, *7-*10 (Del.Ch.) (discussing the process through which Michael 
Ovitz was hired by Walt Disney in 1995).  Despite denying a duties of care and good faith 
challenge against the Ovitz hiring, Chancellor Chandler acknowledged that “the compensation 
committee met for one hour” to discuss the terms of Michael Ovitz’s compensation along with 
the compensation packages for various Disney employees, 121 stock option grants, top-level 
executive Robert Iger's employment agreement, and board member and compensation committee 
chair Irwin Russell's $250,000 compensation for negotiating the Ovitz deal.  Id. at *9 (emphasis 
in the original). 
181 See, e.g., Institutional Shareholder Services, at: http://www.issproxy.com/index.jsp. 
182 Lucien A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 880 
(2005) (“Unlike management, shareholders do not have access to inside, private information.”); 
Larry Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1431, 1467 (2006) (“[E]ven institutional shareholders face obstacles in managing details of 
each firm in their portfolios.”). 
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 Employees are ideally situated to ally with shareholders in an effort to 
police management.  Indeed, this appears to be already taking place.  Labor 
unions, for example, have become much more involved in traditional corporate 
governance activism.183  In the 1980s, unions were generally antagonistic to 
shareholder concerns and supported anti-takeover tactics such as constituency 
statutes.184  However, unions have increasingly joined the side of shareholders 
in pushing through shareholder-friendly corporate governance measures.185  
Unions and union-affiliated pension funds have promoted anti-takeover 
measures through shareholder proposals under SEC Rule 14a-8.186  “The 
amazing thing about these union-sponsored shareholder proposals,” notes one 
set of commentators, “is how ordinary they are, from the perspective of any 
institutional investor.”187 
 There is thus a new role for union activism: an alliance with 
shareholders in an effort to maximize long-term growth for shareholders and 
other stakeholders.188  In particular, unions can use their “monitoring 
advantages to take actions to increase firm value by policing management 
shirking and reducing the agency costs of equity.”189  In addition, unions have a 
greater incentive to monitor management, because “[w]orkers are locked into 
the firm with firm-specific capital investments.”190  If unions can monitor and 
credibly relay their information to other shareholders, their role in current 
corporate governance processes will only expand.191 
 However, the overwhelming majority of employees do not have union 
representation.192  For them there is no institution to play the role that unions 
play in receiving and channeling employee information.  The referendum would 
provide employees with the opportunity to express themselves collectively on 
an issue of corporate governance.  The referendum results, along with the 
information generated by those results, would play a similar role in informing 
shareholders and board members about collective employees concerns.  And 
                                                          
183 Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder 
Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998). 
184 Id. at 1036. 
185 Id. 
186 Examples include efforts to remove poison pills and repeal classified boards.  See id. at 1045-
46. 
187 Id. at 1045. 
188 Schwab & Thomas, supra note 183, at 1090. 
189 Id.  As Schwab and Thomas note, unions have “special monitoring abilities” given their 
closeness to the firm and their access to employee information.  Id. at 1036. 
190 Id. at 1037. 
191 Id.  
192 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, Union Membership in 2006, 
Table 3, January 25, 2007, available at: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm (union 
members account for only 7.4% of the private workforce). 
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employees would have the incentive and the ability to express concerns about 
managerial overreaching.   
 The referenda thus offer the opportunity for employees to join with 
shareholders in policing management opportunism.  Unlike directors, 
employees do not have the complications that can often muffle complaints 
about executive overreaching.193  And unlike shareholders, employees are 
immersed in the firm and are more likely to know about managerial 
misconduct.  Employees could vote against a transaction on the grounds that 
the compensation packages for managers were too rich and undeserved.  
Although this signal would have no binding ramifications, it would highlight a 
problem that shareholders could address in their binding vote on the matter. 
 In addition, employees themselves may have ownership interests in the 
company.  An employee may be invested in her company in a variety of forms.  
The employee might buy stock independently.  A more common scenario 
involves employee purchases of company stock through a 401(k) plan.  Recent 
reports suggest that thirty to forty percent of the assets of 401(k) plans that offer 
an employer stock fund are invested in that fund.194  In fact, lower-wage 
workers are more likely to be heavily invested in their company’s stock.195  But 
employees may also have ownership interests that do not provide the traditional 
shareholders’ rights.  Stock options provide another way for employees to have 
ownership in the company but do not provide a right to vote.  The purpose of 
the stock option is to encourage employees to think like owners.196  Millions of 
employees receive stock options and thus have similar incentives to 
shareholders without a vote on corporate combinations.197 
 The employee referendum thus gives more power to the shareholders 
by increasing the odds that they can use their vote as an effective curb against 
managerial opportunism.  Shareholder proponents have lamented the weakness 
                                                          
193 Schwab & Thomas, supra note 183, at 1038 (“[O]utside directors who are CEOs of another 
company may be unwilling to raise serious questions about executive compensation for fear of 
having the spotlight turned on their own pay one day.”). 
194 Susan J. Stabile, I Believed My Employer and Didn’t Sell My Company Stock: Is there an 
ERISA (or ’34 Act) Remedy for Me?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 385, 385 (2004).  Stabile has criticized 
this underdiversification and has suggested efforts to remedy it.  See id.; Susan J. Stabile, 
Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’s Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants 
to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361 (2002). 
195 Susan J. Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan Investments in Employer Securities, 35 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 543 (2002).  Employers may also match employee contributions with 
their own contributions of company stock.  Howell E. Jackson, To What Extent Should Individual 
Investors Rely on the Mechanisms for Market Efficiency: A Preliminary Investigation of 
Dispersion in Investor Returns, 28 J. CORP. L. 671, 682 n.16 (2003). 
196 Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and Rule 10b-5, 
88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548 (2003). 
197 Id. at 541. 
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of shareholder protections.198  A non-binding employee referendum gives 
shareholders the benefits of employee information with essentially no strings 
attached.  Shareholders may accept or reject employees’ judgments depending 
on their own independent analysis.  But shareholders will benefit from the 
additional set of monitors that the referendum puts in place when it comes to 
corporate combinations.  These monitors will have an incentive to work with 
shareholders, since they have no power acting on their own.  And they have 
common ground: the desire to prevent managerial overreaching.  Indeed, this 
concern may explain why firms have not voluntarily conducted referenda in the 
past: managers may have been afraid of precisely this result. 
If employees vote against a merger because of a particular concern 
about management, managers have the opportunity to correct this problem 
before shareholders vote on the transaction.  This happens from time to time 
without the referenda; for example, in the merger between the MONY Group 
and AXA Financial, MONY postponed a shareholder vote and cut $7.4 million 
out of executive pay packages in response to shareholder concerns about 
excessive compensation.199  But with employees on the scene and able to 
express themselves, there is a greater chance that managerial opportunism will 
be caught and brought to the attention of shareholders.  Knowing this, 
management will be more likely to curb opportunism, both ex ante before the 
referendum and ex post between the referendum and the shareholders’ vote. 
 The employee referendum could be just one part of the new coalition 
between shareholders and employees to discipline top-level management.  
Regardless, the referendum provides shareholders with a way to tap into inside 
knowledge for their own benefit.  This change will strengthen the use of the 
shareholder franchise.200  For this reason, assuming the referenda costs are 
low,201 shareholder primacists should welcome the addition of the non-binding 
employee referendum to the corporate law framework. 
 
III. REFERENDUM AS VOICE 
 
 The employee referendum is a way for employees to communicate their 
opinions about the wisdom of a proposed corporate combination.  This 
communication is beneficial not merely for its instrumentality in increasing in 
                                                          
198 See, e.g., Lucien A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833 (2005). 
199 Jonathan Stempel, MONY delays AXA merger vote, cuts management payout, REUTERS, Feb. 
23, 2004, available at: http://www.forbes.com/newswire/2004/02/23/rtr1271644.html.   
200 Cf. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: 
“Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 263-64 (2001) (discussing the 
importance of shareholder self-governance in the overall structure of the corporation). 
201 See Part IV infra. 
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the flow of information about the transaction. These referenda would also give 
employees a chance to voice their concerns in a systematic and public manner.  
The vote itself – the chance to be heard – has important benefits beyond the 
derivative information gains. 
 This section discusses the benefits of giving employees a voice in the 
corporate transaction.  It starts with the basic sense of satisfaction and utility 
that employees will derive from the vote itself.  It then discusses the 
improvements in employee performance and compliance with institutional 
norms that come from the chance to participate.  Finally, the section discusses 
how improving the civic life of the firm may lead to improved civic life in 
society more generally. 
A. Employee Satisfaction 
 In their landmark study of the state of employee perceptions, Richard 
Freeman and Joel Rogers undertook “the most extensive analysis of American 
worker attitudes toward workplace relationships and power in more than twenty 
years.”202  Using focus groups and telephone surveys of over 2400 employees, 
the Worker Representation and Participation Survey (WRPS) sought to get an 
unbiased look into the concerns of American workers.203  The stakes were 
sufficiently high that management and labor groups fought over the framing of 
the study and its results.204 
 According to the WRPS, workers had one primary concern at the 
workplace: a desire for more voice.  As Freeman and Rogers summarized, 
“American workers want more of a say/influence/representation/participation/-
voice (call it what you will) at the workplace than they now have.”205  The 
study found that employees wanted greater participation because of the 
improvement to their own working lives as well as the improvement to the 
productivity and success of their company.206  They wanted not only voice as 
individuals, but collectively as well – particularly on issues that affected the 
workers as a group.207  Workers wanted their participation to be cooperative 
with management, and believed that management resistance was the primary 
reason they did not have more voice within the firm at present.208 
 Although the WRPS focused on workers’ involvement in employee-
related issues, it found evidence that workers wanted a voice in higher-level 
company concerns, as well.  The study found that over half of the workers 
surveyed worked at a company that had a program for employee involvement, 
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and thirty-one percent of employees participated in these programs.209  A 
substantial number of these employees reported that their employee-
involvement committees discussed issues of corporate direction.210 Overall, 
however, eighty-two percent of employees who participated in employee-
involvement programs believed that giving employees a greater say in these 
programs would make them work better.211  This is consistent with the WRPS’s 
findings that workers want more of a voice. 
The notion that employees want more of a voice is consistent with a 
growing number of findings relating to overall satisfaction in a variety of 
circumstances.  These findings show that humans want more than simply a 
satisfactory outcome; they also place great importance on a satisfactory process.  
The “procedural justice” school of social psychology has emphasized the 
importance of process to individual satisfaction and utility.212  According to 
research, individuals look to a number of factors in determining whether a 
decisionmaking process is procedurally just. The decisionmaker’s impartiality, 
honesty, and ethicality are critical components, as are the opportunity to appeal 
and the quality of the decision.  But another critical component is voice: more 
specifically, some role for being represented within the decisionmaking 
process.  Indeed, the importance of voice is evidenced by “one of the most 
reliable findings in research on procedural justice: that people react more 
favorably to procedures that give them considerable freedom in communicating 
their views and arguments.”213 
 The employee referendum is an opportunity for employees to 
participate in the process of corporate combinations.  As currently constructed, 
this process affords no room for employee voice.  The ball passes from top-
                                                          
209 Id. at 92. 
210 Id. at 102 (noting that twenty-four percent of employees who participated in long-term 
committees discussed issues of corporate direction). 
211 Id. at 113. 
212 Economics and its “rational actor” model of human behavior have tended to focus on the 
utility of actual outcomes in determining overall human satisfaction.  Procedural justice theorists, 
on the other hand, believe that the process whereby that outcome was reached is also critical in 
determining satisfaction with that outcome.  One example of this phenomenon is dissatisfaction 
with dispute resolution procedures even when the dispute is resolved in one’s favor.  In one 
study, those who challenged parking tickets were found to be upset with the court’s procedures, 
even though their cases were dismissed.  E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 2 (1988) (discussing an earlier study).  Procedural justice 
research has focused generally on the influence of such concerns on processes of dispute 
resolution.  See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance 
about Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1389-90 
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level management to the board to the shareholders without any formal method 
for employees to express their opinions.  At best, employees may voice their 
opinions to each other, to their supervisors, or to the media.  But such 
opportunities are interstitial, sporadic, and uncertain.  Moreover, they offer no 
collective opportunity for employees to exercise judgment on the proposed 
transaction.  By denying employees a voice in the process, corporations and 
corporate law reduce employee satisfaction with the outcome, regardless of its 
distributive favorability. 
 Early procedural justice theorists argued that voice and representation 
were important for the effect these had on the ultimate outcome of the 
procedures.214  Participation in the process was not important in and of itself, 
but rather for its instrumental effects.  This theory, known as the “control 
model,” had significant effects on the development of procedural justice 
scholarship.215  However, a growing body of literature suggests that voice is not 
solely important for its effect on the process.  Rather, voice is a non-
instrumental value.  This alternative approach, known as the “group-value” 
model, argues that expression of one’s view is important without reference to 
the impact on the outcome.216  Instead, “[t]he opportunity to present one’s 
views enhances procedural justice judgments in and of itself.”217  These 
findings confirm what is probably intuitive: we appreciate the opportunity to 
make ourselves heard during decisionmaking processes simply for that 
opportunity.  
 These findings have important ramifications for the notion of a non-
binding employee referendum.  One criticism of the proposal would be that 
employees will not care about the opportunity simply to express themselves.  
Because management and shareholders are free to ignore the employees’ vote, 
the vote may seem meaningless and trivial.  But procedural justice findings 
indicate that the vote will have value just as an opportunity for employees to 
express their views.  “Communicating their views and arguments” is itself a 
benefit.218 
 In researching the reasons why voice is a non-instrumental value, social 
psychologists have found that the opportunity to participate has important 
ramifications for a group’s self-valuation.  This model, known as the relational 
model of authority, finds that “people are concerned with those aspects of 
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procedures that convey information to them about their status in their group.”219  
A just process communicates to those involved that they have importance and 
worth to the decisionmakers.  In a study of 404 employees from a variety of 
employment settings,220 Tom Tyler and Steven Blader found strong support for 
the relational model of authority.  Overall the study found that employees 
concerns about procedural justice exceeded their concerns about distributive 
justice and outcome favorability.221  Looking at what employees found most 
important in assessing the fairness of their workplaces, Tyler and Blader found 
that concerns relating to status recognition and neutrality were significantly 
more important than their ability to exercise control over their workplace or the 
likelihood of favorable outcomes.222  To the employees in the study, 
conceptions of fairness were based more on the relational norms evidenced by 
certain procedures, and less on their power to take part in the actual 
decisionmaking. 
These findings suggest that the employee referendum will provide 
employees greater satisfaction by providing employees with a higher level of 
recognition and status.  Having a formalized role in the process demonstrates 
that employees are valued members of the community entitled to participate.  
Even if they have no control over the process, and even if the end result is a 
combination that is disadvantageous to workers, having a role in the process 
will provide employees with a greater sense of fairness and greater satisfaction 
with their workplace.  Combined with the informational benefits that the 
referenda provide to shareholders and directors, the referenda proposal is a win-
win-win for all three of the primary groups involved. 
Of course, it may seem unsettling that employees could be satisfied 
with a largely symbolic role, rather than actual decisionmaking power.  In fact, 
the larger notion that people care more about looking important rather than 
being important suggests the possibility for manipulation or fraud.  Procedural 
justice theorists have described this phenomenon as the “false consciousness 
problem.”223  In one study, for example, an opportunity to voice one’s opinion 
about a decisionmaker’s verdict led to an increase in the perception of fairness 
                                                          
219 TYLER & BLADER, supra note 214, at 91-92 (citing Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A 
Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADV. IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCH. 115, 175-76 
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220 Id. at 18. 
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even when there was no chance of even influencing the decision.224  The 
authors noted that this could lead people to believe that the process was fair 
“even though, by objective criteria, it is patently unfair.”225  An employee 
referendum could fool employees into thinking that their votes mattered when, 
in actuality, they did not.  Given employees’ propensity to overestimate the 
power of their legal rights,226 the referendum may be a tool of keeping 
employees in the dark while extracting valuable information and post-
combination acquiescence. 
This is an overreaction.  Employees should know full well that the vote 
is not binding on the company, and it would not be in management’s interest to 
encourage such a belief.  After all, if the referenda defeats the combination but 
it goes through anyway, the legal reality will hit home.  To the extent that 
management pretends to be interested in the referenda but does not really care, 
that expression of concern may be valuable in and of itself to employees.  Even 
if it is merely symbolic, an expression of employees’ importance to the firm is 
useful and meaningful.  Ultimately, a symbolic expression not only has its own 
meaning, but over time can deepen into a stronger current between management 
and employees.  By establishing a mandatory procedure, the referendum 
proposal provides employees with a voice in the process that upgrades their 
status within the group.  This increase in the procedural justice of the workplace 
not only improves the lot of workers, but also has further benefits for the firm 
and society.  
 
B. Employee Performance and Compliance 
 Providing employees with a voice in the corporate combination process 
would give them a greater sense of fairness and procedural justice with regards 
to that process.  Such a sense is a value in and of itself.  But workers who 
perceive their workplaces are more procedurally just are more likely to work 
cooperatively, follow the firm’s leadership, and comply with ethical guidelines. 
 Getting employees to work cooperatively – that is, to work together for 
the good of the company – is an essential component to successful business.  
As self-interested actors, individuals will generally place their own needs above 
the needs of others.  But in working for a firm, individuals are asked to engage 
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in joint productive activity, in which the gains may not be easily partitionable 
between members.  The notion that firm members must provide individualized 
investments in exchange for uncertain and nonseparable returns has been 
referred to as the “team production” problem.227 Although corporate law 
scholars have focused on agency cost theory in discussing the purpose of the 
firm, some theorists consider the puzzle of team production to be more 
important in explaining the law’s function.228 
 Recent scholarship has focused more specifically on the role of law in 
fostering or impeding the development of cooperative relationships within the 
firm.  The need to develop cooperative behavior through trust may explain such 
corporate law doctrines as the duty of care in the face of the business judgment 
rule, the mandatory nature of the duty of loyalty, and problems with closely-
held corporations.229  But trust may be highly dependent on the social 
context.230  Certain seemingly irrelevant provisions, such as the duty of care, 
can have important representational and relational power in fostering trust 
amongst members of the corporation.  Scholars have argued that failure to take 
trust into account can have deleterious consequences to a firm or to society as 
whole.231  Such observations are backed up by extensive social science findings 
about the importance of group cooperation.232 
 Perceptions that a process or institution is procedurally just have been 
shown to lead to increased cooperative behavior.233  In their study of 
employees, Tyler and Blader found that procedural justice assessments were 
more likely to predict discretionary cooperative group behavior, such as 
complying with work rules and norms, exerting full effort to get the job done, 
deferring to organizational authority, and going beyond job responsibilities to 
help others at the job, than were the employees’ perceptions of distributive 
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228 See, e.g., id. at 249-50, 271. 
229 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations 
of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001). 
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justice or outcome favorability.234  Research has also linked perceptions of 
procedural justice with other attitudes and behavior that are supportive and 
beneficial to the firm as a whole.  Individuals are less likely to leave a group 
and are more committed to their group or organization when they perceive the 
group to be procedurally just.235  They are more likely to perceive the institution 
as acting legitimately.236  Ultimately, a whole host of behaviors beneficial to the 
firm correspond to the procedural justice of the firm.  As Tyler and Blader note: 
 
These results suggest that we know a considerable amount about 
how to encourage the types of cooperative behavior that are 
central to the effectiveness of groups.  We can do so by creating 
structures that enact decision-making processes in ways that 
group members will experience as fair.237 
 
Happiness with the fairness of the process leads to happiness with the 
outcome itself, which leads to greater acceptance of the outcome.  One of the 
most robust findings about procedural justice is that individuals are more likely 
to comply with those outcomes, both in experimental and in real world settings, 
that they perceive as procedurally just.238  Procedural justice judgments have 
been found to be particularly important to adherence to an agreement over 
time.239  Much of this research has focused on responses to judicial or other 
dispute resolution procedures, but it applies as well in the context of group 
decisionmaking. 
This research supports a common sense notion: workers are likely to do 
a better job if they believe their workplace treats them fairly and wants their 
                                                          
234 TYLER & BLADER, supra note 214, at 33, 80-85, & tbl.3. 
235 Id. at 79 (citing ten different studies). 
236 Id.(citing four studies). 
237 Id. at 87. 
238 LIND & TYLER, supra note 212 (discussing experimental support); ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET 
AL., ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE 
ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1988), available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2007/R3676.pdf 
(same); Katherine M. Kitzmann & Robert E. Emery, Procedural Justice and Parents’ 
Satisfaction in a Field Study of Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 553 
(1993) (discussing results from actual field study); E. Allan Lind et al., The Winding Road from 
Employee to Complainant: Situational and Psychological Determinants of Wrongful Termination 
Claims, ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. (2000) (same); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate 
Dispute Resolution, 38 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 224 (1993) (same). 
239 D.G. Pruitt et al., Long-term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 313 (1993); 
D.G. Pruitt et al., Goal Achievement, Procedural Justice, and the Success of Mediation, 1 INT’L J. 
CONFLICT MGMT. 33 (1990). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMPLOYEE REFERENDA 48  
input.240  As discussed above, these results do not ride in ultimate control over 
the actual outcomes, or even the value of those outcomes.  An employee 
referendum would provide employees with a way of participating in the 
transforming transaction.  As a result, it will lead to better cooperation and 
compliance within the workplace.241 
 
C. Social Capital 
 In her recent book Working Together, Cynthia Estlund discusses the 
importance of workplace interaction to democratic life in a civil society.242  In 
her view, the workplace is “the single most important site of both cooperative 
interaction and sociability among adult citizens outside the family.”243  The 
focus of Estlund’s book is the workplace’s role in creating bonds between 
individuals from different racial, ethnic, and religious groups, as well as 
between men and women.  But her insights on the role of the workplace as an 
institution for civic life have important ramifications for this article’s 
referendum proposal. 
 Estlund argues that the workplace is a critical institution for the 
reinvigoration of civic life.  Citing the recent literature on “social capital,”244 
Estlund demonstrates that social capital is “linked to an array of social goods, 
including greater prosperity, health and well-being, safe neighborhood, and 
better government.”245  She argues, however, that social capital theorists have 
lamented the decline of civic institutions while overlooking the role of the 
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workplace in fostering greater social capital.  In Estlund’s view, “the workplace 
[is] a central site of social capital building in contemporary society.”246 
 If Estlund is correct, then the employee referendum could be an 
important way of encouraging and developing social capital amongst 
employees.  As discussed above, employee referenda would foster a climate of 
greater procedural justice, leading to greater cooperation and trust within the 
firm.  In essence, greater procedural justice has been shown to lead to greater 
social capital within the firm.  In addition, part of social capital is so-called 
“civic skills” – “skills of communication, compromise, and collective 
decisionmaking, and a sense of political efficacy.”247  As an exercise in 
corporate democracy, the referendum would facilitate the development of these 
skills.  Estlund makes an eloquent plea for the importance of workplace 
discussions to the realm of public discourse.248  Arguing that the workplace is 
“a leading site of public discourse,” Estlund describes how at the workplace, 
employees practice their deliberation skills, discuss topics of national 
importance, and reach across family and neighborhood boundaries.249  The 
employee referendum would facilitate all of these, in a forum that allows for 
direct participation on an issue of importance to the entire workforce. 
 Moreover, the employee referendum would mitigate some of the 
concerns that social theorists have about the workplace as an institution of civic 
life.  For example, theorists are concerned with the instrumental and 
hierarchical context in which managers can rule the workplace.250  Estlund 
herself recognizes that “[t]o the extent that the workplace is a major site for the 
formation of social capital, it contributes very unequal portions of those assets 
to individuals and groups at different rungs of the socioeconomic ladder.”251  
She counters: “These concerns are mitigated but not dissolved by trend towards 
greater collaboration and less rigid hierarchies in the workplace.”252  The 
referendum is an opportunity for collaboration and equality: all get to vote, and 
each vote has the same weight.  It would thus mirror the democratic institutions 
that social theorists are hoping to nuture. 
 There is another way in which benefits from employee referenda may 
spill out beyond the firm and into the public at large.  These referenda may 
serve to reinvigorate the discussion about possible new channels for employee-
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firm relations across society.253  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when states 
were passing corporate “constituency” statutes, some believed that the statutes 
were important simply for their symbolic value.254  As one commentator 
argued: 
 
. . . [T]he fact that half of the states have enacted legislation that 
recognizes that employees are stakeholders in their firms is an 
important event, if only for its symbolic value. The very 
enactment of such statutes suggests that employees' interests are 
beginning to receive serious attention in the public mind. It 
therefore suggests the possibility that effective means of 
protecting them can be developed in the future.255 
 
As I have argued above, I believe that employee referenda would have 
substantial informational and participatory benefits to employees.   But they 
would also have a symbolic meaning to the public at large: employees matter.  
The referendum is not intended to be a “camel’s nose under the tent” leading to 
a binding employee referendum down the road.  But it is supposed to be one 
piece of a new approach to employer-employee relations that will recast those 
relations for a new century.  The referendum proposal may stimulate other ways 
in which relations between managers, directors, shareholder and employees can 
be restructured for the greater fairness and efficiency of corporate law and 
society as a whole. 
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 Parts II and III of this paper discuss the benefits in implementing a 
system of non-binding employee referenda for corporate combinations.  This 
part concerns the costs of implementation.  There are a myriad of ways of 
setting up a system of referenda.  But such a system will inevitably impose 
some costs on businesses.  Employees must register their votes, and then the 
firm must tabulate and announce the results.  These processes take employee 
time and firm resources.  These costs must be weighed against the benefits in 
deciding the wisdom of implementing the plan.  Below are some initial 
thoughts on how the referenda could be constructed to keep costs as low as 
possible while still retaining the key elements. 
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A. Bright Line Rules 
 In order to keep the process as straightforward as possible, the 
legislation should be crafted to match up with bright-line rules that firms could 
easily follow in holding the referenda.  First, the definition of “employee” is a 
source of some controversy, as temporary employees, employees of 
subcontractors, and independent contractors all may be considered “employees” 
depending on the statute or state common law in question.256  In order to ease 
administration, firms should count as employees those workers whom they 
count as employees for tax purposes.257  Both the company and the IRS are 
likely to keep accurate and up-to-date records of a company’s employees.  
Introducing a different standard is likely to cause further confusion and delay. 
 In addition, states should set a flexible but easy to calculate timeline for 
holding the vote.  There must be enough time after the announcement for 
employees to process and share information about the transaction, but it must 
be sufficiently before the shareholder vote to allow for shareholders and 
directors to respond to the results.258  Perhaps the proposal could require that 
the referenda not be held less than thirty days after the announcement, but its 
results must be announced at least thirty days prior to the shareholder’s vote.  If 
the latter requirement were not followed, shareholders would have the right to 
petition a court for a delay in the vote in order to meet the thirty-day period.259 
 
B. Distribution and Election Costs  
 Beyond these bright line rules, companies should have considerable 
flexibility in establishing the process through which employees would vote.  
This flexibility will enable companies to experiment with the process and 
develop the most cost effective means of processing the votes. 
 The cost of running an employee referendum might initially seem 
comparable with the costs of conducting elections over shareholder proposals, 
which have been estimated at $87,000 per proposal.260  However, $37,000 is 
                                                          
256 Compare Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) 
(discussing the common law control test for employee status) with Secretary of Labor v. 
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534-35 (1987) (discussing the “economic realities” test under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act).  See STONE, supra note 173, at 67-86 (discussing the changing nature of 
employment). 
257 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 3306, 3121, 3401-04 (2006) (defining employees for purposes of federal 
taxes). 
258 Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2007) (providing that shareholders must receive proxy 
materials at least 20 days before the vote). 
259 The right would be akin to shareholders’ rights to call an election if the corporation has failed 
to hold one.  See id.§ 211(c). 
260 Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. 240 (1998) (Release No. 34-
40,018) (describing 80 firms reporting on proposal inclusion determination costs and 67 reporting 
on printing and other direct costs).  Robert Romano has thus argued that limiting or eliminating 
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estimated as expense for deciding whether to include the proposal or not.261  As 
for the $50,000 in printing, distribution, and tabulation costs, those costs would 
be substantially smaller for an employee referendum.  Because the company 
has a direct connection to its employees, it can use interoffice to distribute the 
materials; in the alternative, materials may be distributed electronically for 
more savings.  Similarly, the vote need not be conducted at polling stations 
with paper ballots during work hours; instead, the company could use a website  
to collect and tally the votes.  As Internet access continues to grow and expand 
across the population, the ability to coordinate the distribution of information 
together with the actual voting will mean fairly low costs for conducting the 
employee referendum online.262  
 
C. State Law Enactment 
Much has been written about the advantages and disadvantages of our 
state, as opposed to federal, system of corporate law.263  Because mergers and 
acquisitions are controlled by state law, the employee referendum makes sense 
as a creature of state law.  It is designed to work within that system and be a 
part of the corporate combination process.  Although it may, perhaps, be 
possible for such a requirement to be imposed through federal law,264 it would 
                                                                                                                                             
shareholder proposals could save companies over a billion dollars.  Roberta Romano, Less is 
More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 
18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 248 (2001) (“The savings to firms from eliminating the subsidy for 
shareholder proposals that fail to receive at least 40% of the votes ranges, across the differing 
historical capitalization rates, from $1.9 billion to $293 million.”). 
261 Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, supra note ARSP. 
262 SUROWIECKI, supra note 136, at 207 (noting that “dramatic improvements in information 
technology have made the diffusion of information to large numbers of employees feasible and 
cost-effective”). 
 Ideally, the technology would balance the need for a secure ballot with an effort to make 
sure than the firm could not check to see how individual employees voted.  This technology has 
already been implemented for employee shareholders, who often receive their proxy materials 
electronically.  See D. Craig Norlund, Electronic Dissemination of Disclosure Documents, 
Practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. 
B0-006E, January-February, 1999, at *77 (“The fastest growing audience for electronic proxy 
material and annual report distribution is employee stockholders.”).  Such materials must allow 
for employee shareholders to vote confidentially so as to avoid retaliation for their votes. 
263 For a recent summary of the literature on corporate law federalism, see Brett H. McDonnell, 
Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30, J. CORP. L. 99, 103-09 (2006). 
264 It may be necessary to enact such referenda through federal law if they would otherwise be 
preempted by federal law.  The most likely candidate for preemption would be the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  The NLRA protects collective activity on the part of workers.  See 
29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (2006).  If a state were to provide its own remedies for employees 
who had been fired or otherwise discriminate against because of their vote, such remedies might 
conflict with the NLRA’s remedies and thus be subject to preemption.  See San Diego Building 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (holding that states cannot regulate conduct that 
is at least arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA).  However, states have traditionally be 
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be an overlay on top of a distinct legal regime.  And it would be subject to 
criticism as a federal intrusion upon state practices of corporate governance. 
Implementing the referenda through state law has functional 
advantages as well.  Since the referenda has not been tried anywhere, it is by its 
very nature an experimental project.  In Justice Brandeis’s memorable phrase, 
states serve as “laboratories” of democracy and “try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”265  This notion has come to 
life in corporate law.266  States could implement the referenda in a variety of 
different ways and determine, by looking at others, which practices work 
best.267 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In closing, let us revisit the opening quote from the email by Robert 
Hughes to Gerald Levin.  In retrospect, the email may be spiteful and 
vindictive, but it is also well-founded.  The merger with AOL was indeed 
disastrous.268  But the email was written not in January 2000, or even January 
2001, but in 2002, well after the initial hopes of the merger had been shown to 
be unfounded.  With the benefit of hindsight, Hughes can declaim against the 
combination with effective bitterness.  But what did he think in 2000? 
 This “what-if” demonstrates the possibilities for the employee 
referendum.  If employees, along with the shareholders, had overwhelmingly 
approved the merger, then it would be much harder for Hughes and those like 
him to center their anger on the CEO.  Instead of feeling justly vengeful, 
Hughes might have to look inward, first, to see how he and his fellow 
employees voted.  Given the apparent stock price boost that the merger seemed 
to have in store for Time Warner shareholders, employees might have voted for 
                                                                                                                                             
given great deference in establishing their own systems of corporate governance.  See Santa Fe v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1977).  Given that the vote would be part of the state’s scheme of 
corporate law, state corporate law interests should outweigh any potential overlap the referendum 
has with NLRB processes. 
265 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
266 Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209 (2006). 
267 Cf. David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294 (2006).  Moreover, as corporations 
are governed by their state of incorporation, the experiment’s subjects are free to leave if they 
wish to opt out – the “genius” of American law.  ROMANO, supra note 10.  A mass desertion, 
however, seems extremely unlikely, given the low costs. 
268 It is interesting to note that the two principals behind the merger (Time Warner CEO Gerald 
Levin and AOL CEO Stephen Case) are not only no longer with the company, but have removed 
themselves to the edges of corporate America.  See Lillian Ross, Spa Man, NEW YORKER, July 9, 
2007 (reporting that Case owns a spa in Arizona called Miraval); Seth Stephenson, The Believer, 
N.Y. MAG., July 16, 2007, at 24, 26 (reporting that Levin is presiding director of Moonview 
Sanctuary, a “holistic healing institute” with a full-time staff of fewer than twenty people).  
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the merger to support their 401(k) and stock option plans.  Having bought into 
the merger from the beginning, perhaps they would have given less resistance 
to it and would have made the transition smoother and ultimately more 
successful. 
 Or perhaps employees would have voted against the merger.  After-the-
fact accounts bristle with Time Warner employees who were horrified at the 
merger and never thought it would work.269  If they truly were against the 
merger from the start, employees could have put a splash of cold water on a 
process that was all heat and light.  Directors, shareholders, and the media 
would have asked why, and would have found business-judgment concerns, 
employee-centered concerns, or concerns about managerial opportunism – or 
all three.  These doubts might have led to more questions about whether the 
proposed combination was as good an idea as was touted.  Even if the merger 
had gone through, perhaps the company, its shareholders, and the media would 
not have been so optimistic about the immediate future, and the subsequent 
downturn would have been less crushing.  Moreover, having been given a say 
in the process, employees may have been more receptive to the combination 
and may have worked to make it more successful. 
 This is speculation.  But behind the speculation about this particularly 
ill-conceived merger lies the possibility for a different future.  Economic, 
psychological, and corporate law research suggests that employees may have 
the information and the interest in participating formally in their company’s 
decisions to combine with another.  The employee referendum would be a 
straightforward yet significant way of bringing them into the conversation. 
                                                          
269 See, e.g., MUNK, supra note 62; SWISHER, supra note 1. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proposed changes to Delaware Law 
(Changes to existing statute in bold) 
 
 
DEL. CODE ANN. 
TITLE 8 
 
§ 251. Merger or consolidation of domestic corporations and limited liability 
company 
 
  . . . 
 
(new c) At least 30 days after the adoption of the agreement, the 
corporation shall hold a non-binding referendum in which all employees 
[as defined by state tax law] shall vote on the agreement.  The results of 
this referendum must be announced publicly at least 30 days prior to the 
holding of the special stockholders meeting in subsection (d). 
 
 
(c) (new d) The agreement required by subsection (b) of this section shall be 
submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation at an annual or 
special meeting for the purpose of acting on the agreement. Due notice of the 
time, place and purpose of the meeting shall be mailed to each holder of stock, 
whether voting or nonvoting, of the corporation at the stockholder's address as 
it appears on the records of the corporation, at least 20 days prior to the date of 
the meeting. The notice shall contain a copy of the agreement or a brief 
summary thereof, as the directors shall deem advisable. The notice shall 
include the results of the employee referendum in subsection (c).  At the 
meeting, the agreement shall be considered and a vote taken for its adoption or 
rejection. If a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to 
vote thereon shall be voted for the adoption of the agreement, that fact shall be 
certified on the agreement by the secretary or assistant secretary of the 
corporation. If the agreement shall be so adopted and certified by each 
constituent corporation, it shall then be filed and shall become effective, in 
accordance with § 103 of this title. 
 
 
 
 
 
